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The characteristics of public outdoor recreation as a public good 
are ascertained. A cost-benefit analysis is applied which ensures 
efficiency, while allowing for the pecuniary and technological externalities 
that exist in the development of outdoor recreation resorts. 
A total willingness to pay technique is utilized to approximate the 
consumer's valuation of benefits from recreation. Essential to the 
technique is the derivation of total willingness to pay curve which 
parallels the demand curve for private goods. Total willingness to 
pay is used instead of consumer's surplus, because the latter is associated 
with a market price which is not determined for public outdoor recreation. 
Since the total willingness to pay curve is a function of income 
distribution, once derived, the curve can be adjusted to rid the analysis 
of income distribution bias. The adjustment helps achieve equity in 
the allocation of recreational resorts. 
Fort Frederick State Park provided a case of application for the 
technique. A sample survey conducted in the Fort was the basis for the 
derivation of a total willingness to pay curve. The curve shows the 
relation between expenditures incurred, in time and money, to visits at 
Fort Frederick. The rates of growth for expenditures, income and 
population were the basis for the simulation of the total willingness 
to pay up to the year 2000. Integration of the areas under the simulated 
demand curves was an approximation of the future willingness to pay or 
benefits derived from recreational experience at the Fort. 
After dividing the discounted value of benefits by the estimated 
costs of developing the Fort, a benefit-cost ratio was obtained, which 
was a quantitative endorsement in favor of the development of Fort 
Frederick. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The economics of recreation
1 
is the economics of leisure time. 
Whereas economics so far has concerned itself with that aspect of time 
in which man is productive, the economics of recreation will study 
man at his leisure. It is important to ponder the reasons which 
have made recreation a subject for study in economics. One reason 
could be the scarcity as evidenced both in time and the recreational 
facilities available. When man was living in the wilderness, both 
time and space in which he could roam were free goods and as such 
economics had nothing to contribute. 
Although the rise in productivity has increased leisure time, 
the number of activities that one can engage in have also risen by 
leaps and bounds. Leisure is a scarcity in abundance. Today's urban 
dweller can scarcely find either the time or the space in which to spend 
that time. It is safe to say that man was pressed for time before he 
was pressed for space. The outcome of this lag in the scarcity of 
the two factors in the field of economics can perhaps be seen in the 
fact that the concept of opportunity cost of labor has been with us 
a little longer than the available tools in the area of economics of 
recreation. 
1Recreation, here, means outdoor recreation. 
2 
Another reason giving rise to the study of leisure and recreation 
can perhaps be found in the fact that much of today's working environ-
ment is divorced of both the environmental calm and temporal serenity 
that were associated with working conditions of less technical 
intensity. An agrarian society is less tense because work is mixed 
with leisure and also the environment is conducive to recreating. 
Today, the division of labor, as intense as it is, has compelled man 
to seek recreation in its own right, and economics, with a usual lag 
in response, has turned to study it as a subject. 
Whereas the Greeks prized creativity and considered the devotion 
2 
of leisure time to intellectual contemplation as the ultimate good, 
modern man takes refuge into leisure and recreation from all that 
surrounds him including intellectual contemplation. The economics 
of recreation has the full backing of this reorientation in outlook. 
The Problem 
Although the development of most of the state parks took place 
in the 1930's, recently there has been a resurgence of interest in the 
development of forests and parks. Whereas in the 1930's, the main 
purpose in the development of recreational facilities was to increase 
2Robert J. Daiute, "Methods for Determination of Demand for 
Outdoor Recreation," Land Economics, (August, 1966). 
3 
employment, today's efforts stem from the plight of urban congestion, 
a concern for ecological equilibrium, and the preservation of historic 
and scenic sights, all of which are of an aesthetic nature. 
The availability of funds, for the purposes intended, however, 
does not guaranteee their optimal and equitable allocation. Hence, the 
need for an economic evaluation of recreational projects becomes urgent. 
Such analysis must pass the test of efficiency and be amenable to the 
bio-psychological urge for which recreation is needed. 
Objectives 
With these remarks about recreation in mind, and especially 
considering the greater importance of recreation in society as technology 
and specialization increase, and as income, population pressure, and 
lesiure time also increase, the objectives of this study are: 
(1) To ascertain the attributes of outdoor recreation as a 
public good. 
(2) To explore the causes of market failure in outdoor recreation. 
And as a corollary to show the ineffectiveness of fees as a 
rationing device in the use of recreational facilities. 
(3) To develop a method of analysis for the assessment of recrea-
tion as a public good. 
(a) To discern the internal and external costs and benefits 
associated with outdoor recreation. 
(b) To evaluate those benefits and costs. 
4 
(c) To elaborate on the relation of efficiency to equity in 
developing public outdoor recreation resorts. 
(d) To quantify the relations between population and income 
on the use of recreational facilities. 
(4) To analyze Fort Frederick State Park as a recreational 
resort as an example of the application of the methods 
developed. 
Methodology 
This study is divided into three phases: The theoretical, the 
analytical and the applied phase. 
The theoretical phase is largely an attempt to level the grounds 
on which outdoor recreation will be seen as a public good, with the 
implication that public decision making should prevail over those 
arrived at through the market. To achieve that purpose the literature 
on externalities or public goods is brought to bear upon the nature 
of outdoor recreation. 
The analytical phase is an exploration of cost-benefit analysis 
through the use of consumer's surplus and the total willingness to 
pay in an effort to achieve efficiency in the production of public 
goods at large, and in recreation goods in ·particular. 
The applied part is an analysis of Fort Frederick as a public 
recreation resort. Through the use of a sample survey and attendance 
data which were available, a demand curve, or better called a total 
5 
willingness to pay curve, is derived for the use of Fort Frederick. 
The area under the curve is integrated to see whether the expenditures 
by the users exceeds the cost incurred in the development of the fort. 
Finally, some suggestions are offered for achieving equity in addition 
to efficiency in planning for recreation. 
CHAPTER II 
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE MARKET 
FAILURE IN THEIR EVALUATION 
Introduction: The Dichotomy of 
Private and Public Goods 
The essence of the controversy of private goods versus public 
goods, is to define the area of public responsibility in the economic 
life of a community. Public goods are produced and distributed through 
political institutions. It is the market that bears the task of 
production and exchange of private goods. Our predictions about the 
supply and demand for private goods are close approximations of 
reality only to the extent to which the assumptions made about the 
underlying market structure are correct. In the analysis of public 
goods, however, a market structure does not exist. Since public goods, 
as the name indicates, entail concern for a large number, each merits 
a separate study on its own rights. 
The public good that is the aim of this study is public outdoor 
recreation. This Chapter is to establish the basis on which outdoor 
recreation is a public good. As such the Chapter is not an in depth 
study of the theory of public goods. The more specific objective of 
the Chapter is to unravel the implications of categorizing recreation 
as a public good on the method of analysis that is pursued for the 
evaluation of recreation. 
7 
Before analyzing the nature of public goods, however, let us look 
at the evolution of thought with regard to theorizing on public 
goods. 
The field of economics is replete with the analysis of markets and 
theories of supply and demand for private goods. Public goods, on the 
other hand, have received less attention at the theoretical level. In 
fact it was the European writers who had taken the initiative in the 
theoretical analysis of the public goods •1 Perhaps this theoretical 
lead by the European authors is predicated by the socialization of many 
industries that have taken place in Europe. 
Among the American writers who have taken up the task of 
theorizing about public goods, two views are discernible: 
(1) The view that public goodsare a case of market failure 
and as such requires collective intervention.
2 
1 Allen Peacock and R.A. Musgrave, ed., Classics in the Theory of 
Public Finance, (London: Macmillan, 1958). 
2The proponents of this view include Paul A. Samuelson. See his 
three essays entitled, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures", 11 Dia-
gramatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditures, 11 and "Aspects 
of Public Expenditure Theories, 11 in The Collected Scientific Papers, 
ed. by Joseph E. Stiglitz, II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. 
Press, 1966), 1223-1239,; another proponent of this view is Mancur 
Olson, Jr. See his The Logic of Collective Action, (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965), and Mancur Olson, Jr., 
and Richard Zeckhauser, "The Efficient Production of External Economies, 11 
American Economic Review, (June, 1970). The theme of market failure 
in the presence of externalities and the need for collective action in 
the face of externalities is recurrent in the three articles by Samuelson 
and the ones written by Olson. A passage from the last article by 
Olson which reflects the notion of this recurrent theme is quoted, 
which can be advantageously compared with that of footnote 3. 
Continued on next page. 
(2) The view that the existence of public goods does not call 
for collective action and that the market can still be 
entrusted with the task of allocation of resources. 3 
8 
2continued. "Thus, whether external economies or external 
diseconomies are at issue, independent market adjustments will in 
general be inefficient in two distinct ways, only one of which has been 
properly understood. ~1en there are externalities of either kind, it 
will not only be true that independent adjustment in a free market will 
lead to production at a level that is not Pareto optimal, but also that 
the method of production of the external economy or the effort to 
combat the external diseconorny will in general be inefficient. In 
other words, the location of the needed efforts will not be in accord 
with the principles of comparative advantage. It follows that, 
contrary to the impression created by the recent literature, what we 
have is a new idea about how resources should be allocated in the 
presence of externalities, and an additional argument for collective 
intervention in markets with externalities." 
3For a support of this view see: James M. Buchanan and M. Kafoglis, 
"A Note on Public Goods Supply," American Economic Review, (June, 1963). 
In addition, see the following three articles: James M. Buchanan and 
William Craig Stubblebine, "Externality," Economica, (November, 1962); 
Richard Coase, "The Problem of Social Cost," Journal of Law and 
Economics, (October, 1960) ; and 0. A. Davis and A. Whins ton, "Externali-
ties, Welfare and the Theory of Games," Journal of Political Economy, 
(June, 1962). All three articles are summarized by Ralph Turvey in "On 
the Divergence Between Social and Private Cost," Economica, (August, 
1963). Turvey summarizes the main conclusions of those articles as 
follows: 
"The first is that if the party imposing external diseconomies 
and the party suffering them are able and willing to negotiate to 
their mutual advantage, state intervention is unnecessary to secure 
optimum resource allocation. 11 i.e., imposing a tax is unnecessary. 
"The second is that the imposition of a tax upon the party imposing 
external diseconomies can be a very complicated matter, even in 
principle, so that the a priori prescription of such a tax is unwise." 
9 
Toward Defining Public Goods 
In the absence of a concrete definition, insight can be gained 
by looking at the controversies that have surrounded the attempts to 
define public goods. 
Samuelson in his first article
4 
on public goods defined "collective 
consumption goods" as those "which all enjoy in common in the sense that 
each individual's consumption of such a good leads to no subtraction 
from any other individual's consumption of that good." In mathematical 
notation (consistent with his second article)
5 x
2
, a collective con-
sumption good is defined as: 
1 2 
where superscripts 1 and 2 stand for the two consumers of the collective 
good. 
A "private consumption" good is defined as that "which can be 
parcelled out among different individuals • • • according to the rela-
tions," 
4Paul Samuelson, "The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures," Review 
of Economics and Statistics, (November, 1954). 
, "Diagramatic Exposition of a Theory of Public -----:-:-----
Expenditures," Review of Economics and Statistics, (November, 1955). 
5 
where the subscripts stand for the private good and the superscripts 
indicate the individual consumers. 6 
10 
Although Samuelson's original formulation is of enough generality 
to encompass both the production and the consumption side of public goods, 
his further elaboration has been limited to the consumption side only. 
Samuelson's definition of public goods, however, is rather rigid. 
Critics were fast to draw attention to the rigidity of his definition. 
The gist of their criticism is best summarized by Samuelson himself: 
"Is it factually true that most--or any!--of 
the functions of government can be properly fitted 
into your extreme category of public good? Can 
education, the courts, public defense, highway 
programs, police and fire protection be put into 
this rigid category of a public good available to 
all? In practically everyone of these cases 
isn't there an element of variability in the benefit 
that can go to one citizen at the expense of some 
other citizens?"7 
To this criticism he "fully agrees," but does not allow the critics 
to draw their proper conclusions from his concession. In his words: 
6 A remarkable duality, noted by Samuelson, about the two goods 
is the following: "Private goods whose totals add--such as x
1 
= xi + 
x2 --lead ultimately to the marginal conditions of simultaneous equality--
l 1 2 
such as MC = MRS = MRS • Public goods whose totals satisfy a relation 
of simultaneous equality--such as x2 = X~ = x; lead ultimately to the 
marginal conditions that add--such as MC = MRS 1 + MRS 2 ." op. cit., 
1955. 
7 op. cit., 1955. 
"However, to say that a thing is not located at 
the South Pole does not logically place it at the 
North Pole. To deny that most public functions fit 
into my extreme definition of a public good is not 
to grant that they satisfy the logically equally--
extreme category of a private good. To say that 
your absence at a concert may contribute to my 
enjoyment is not to say that the elements of public 
services can be put into homogeneous additive 
packages capable of being gptimally handled by the 
ordinary market calculus." 
11 
Between the North Pole and the South Pole the distance is immense; 
there is ample room for things to fall in. It is no wonder that in 
many of the writings externalities both in consumption and production, 
and goods that exhibit increasing returns to scale have not been 
9 distinguished from public goods. Let us see if this lack of 
distinction which puts them all in one category is justified. 
Externalities and Public Goods 
As already indicated, some writers do not make a sharp distinction 
between the cases of externalities and the public goods. As a matter 
of fact the term "public bad" and external diseconomies are used 
synonymously. Indeed, another definition of public good offered by 
Samuelson, namely that "any good with the property of entering into two 
or more person's preference functions simultaneously," very closely 
resemble the definition offered by Scitovsky for external economies in 
consumption. 
8 Samuelson, 1955, op. cit. 
9 For example, in the following sentence from Olson, 1970, op. cit. 
"Consider a case in which there are two relevant alternative ways to 
produce a given external economy or collective good," p. 515. 
"The individual person's satisfaction may depend 
not only on the quantities of products he consumes 
and services he reygers but also on the satisfaction 
of other persons." 
The difference between externalities and public goods (or bads) 
12 
is one of degree rather than one of kind. It is the degree of exter-
nalities that determines the publicness of a good. 
In the following two examples where the externalities are some-
what bucolic in nature public intervention may not be called for and 
the divergence between the social and private marginal costs may go 
unheeded: (1) Where a beekeeper and an apple grower are closely 
situated, the bees feed upon the essential apple nectar from the 
blossoms and subsequently produce honey. Thus, the production of 
honey not only involves the labor of the beekeeper but also the 
availability of apple blossoms and accordingly, the level of apple 
production. The production of an additional unit of apples may 
entail one more unit of labor and its cost will be the wage rate. 
Since an additional unit of apples entails more apple nectar, which 
goes in the production of honey, the wage rate is an understatement 
of the value of an additional unit of apples. 11 Or, (2) In the case 
of Salton Sea, in Southern California, a tremendous input of fertilizers 
from the many farms provide the fishery with a high level of nutrients. 
10
Tibor Scitovsky, "The Two Concepts of External Economies, 11 The 
Journal of Political Economy, (April, 1954). 
11
The example, originally offered by Meade, is given by C.E. 
Ferguson, Microeconomic Theory, (Homewood, Illinois: Richard D. Irwin, 
Inc., 1969), p. 462. 
The farmers, in this case, pay for the fertilizer and the fishermen 
12 enjoy part of the benefit free of charge. 
On the other hand, when the degree of externalities may be 
13 
technological, as in the case of smog and pollution (public bads), and/ 
or the external effects are of importance to the society as in the case 
of elimination of syphillis or decreasing crimes by providing recreational 
facilities (to the extent that that correlation can be established), 13 
then public intervention is called for on the grounds of those 
externalities. Thus, it is "the 'external effect' basic to the very 
14 
notion of collective consumption goods," that calls for collective 
intervention. 
Public Goods and Indivisibilities 
Indivisibilities could occur either in consumption, or production, 
or perhaps in both. 
The cases of production indivisibilities are also called increasing 
or decreasing returns to scale as opposed to a case where constant 
returns to scale might prevail. With increasing returns to scale, 
average cost declines over the relevant range. This is likely to lead 
via economic warfare, to monopoly and monopoly price. Even if the 
12Larry Tombaugh, "External Benefits of Natural Environments," 
in Recreation Symposium Proceedings, by Northeastern Forest Experiment 
Station, United States Department of Agriculture, Upper Darby, 
Pennsylvania, 1971, p. 73. 
13M h' . ' Ch III d IV ore on t lS polnt ln apters an • 
14 
Samuelson, op. cit., 1954, p. 389. 
14 
situation does not lead to monopoly it nonetheless leads to market 
f .1 15 a1 ure. 
If indivisibilities occur in consumption, however, providing one 
more individual with the consumption of the good in question may cost 
zero. That is, MC does not exist, and the market failure repeats 
itself. Hence, providing one more person with the opportunity for 
outdoor recreation, or the opportunity to go to school, or to be pro-
tected against a foreign attack, or to benefit from viewing a landing 
on anotht'<r planet, or the safety provided by police patrol of an area, 
etc., etc., are cases where the additional costs are zero. 
Yet, in almost all of these cases "it is in the selfish interest 
of each person to give false signals, to pretend to have less interest 
16 
in a given consumption activity than he really has." Put differently, 
ever since Wicksell, it has been recognized that any attempt to get 
consumers to reveal their preference regarding public goods is bound 
to fail. That the rational thing for any individual consumer to do is 
to understate his demand, in the expectation that he would thereby be 
relieved of part or all of his share of the cost without affecting the 
. b . d 17 quant1ty o ta1ne • 
15 
Ferguson, op. cit., p. 463. Also see Samuelson, op. cit., 1955, 
p. 335. 
16 Samuelson, 1954, op. cit., pp. 388-389. 
17 A.R. Prest and R. Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," 
Vol. III of Surveys of Economic Theory by American Economic Association 
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Figure l(a). Private Goods Figure l(b). Public Goods 
The aggregation of the individual demand curves is done by 
horizontal summation in case of private goods (AB +CD= CEF), the 
aggregation is obtained by vertical summation in the case of public 
goods (IJ + KL = MNL). 
The vertical summation in the latter case reflects the fact that 
though individuals may differ in their marginal valuation of a given 
quantity of a commodity, they all consume the same amount, in that 
each unit is consumed by all of them. 
In the case of private goods price is constant and the consumers 
differ in quantities they consume--total quantity is the sum of 
individual quantities. In the case of public goods quantity is 
constant and not subject to variation, it is logical for individual 
16 
preferences to be reflected in their marginal valuation, the sum total 
of which can be obtained by vertical summation of the demand curves. 
The relevance of this discussion for our purpose is that where 
commodities are supplied at zero prices or at non-market clearing prices 
like in charging fees for entrance to a recreation resort, which bears 
no relationship to consumer preferences, the market fails to exist, let 
alone its failure to signal prices for arriving at investment decisions. 
Criteria for Defining Public Goods: 
A Synthesis 
Public goods are of varied nature. As has been seen, different 
causes account for their existence. Such being the case a set of 
criteria, can do a better job of distinguishing public goods than a 
concrete definition that is likely to leave out several categories as 
undefined. Yet the set of criteria, offered here, is by no means 
exhaustive. The categories of public goods is perhaps best left open-
ended; for several of them have been added to the list recently, and 
who knows how the list will fare in the future. 
a. The 11non-exclusion11 criterion: The meaning that a public 
good once provided, its use by one person does not interfere 
with its use by another person. 
b. The 11 jointness in supply 11 criterion: meaning that the 
cost of providing the good for one additional person (MC) is 
zero. 
17 
c. The "merit want" criterion: meaning that the consumption of 
a good (or the avoidance of a bad) rests on the merits 
intrinsic in the good. 
Up to the point of capacity limitation, the use of public outdoor 
facilities by one person does not "exclude" another party from enjoying 
its benefits. By the same token the cost of providing space for the 
inclusion of one more person in recreational activities is zero. In 
addition, the biological and psychological needs for recreation are 
indications of the merits in engaging in those activities. 
All these reasons are compelling enough to heed public provisions 
for the availability of the recreation resorts. 
The evaluation of public goods can be discussed briefly now that 
the basis for recognition of public goods has been established. 
Evaluation of Public Goods: Consumer's 
Surplus Replaces Marginalism 
As in establishing the causes of market failure in the case of 
public goods, the calculus of efficiency for private goods is also 
rendered obsolete for public goods. It is obvious that marginalism 
(MC = MR) has been the accepted criterion for achieving efficiency 
and maximizing utility at the same time. However, when 
indivisibilities and externalities prevail the use of the above 
18 
criterion is either inappropriate or impossible. As Myint18 noted 
as far back as 1948, in such cases the consumer's surplus enables one 
to determine whether or not a particular good should be abandoned or 
a new one introduced. In a nutshell, economic analysis requires that 
marginalism to give way to consumer's surplus technique, in cases of 
public goods. The next Chapter is a detailed analysis of techniques for 
evaluating public goods. 
18see E.J. Mishan, "A Survey of Welfare Economics, 1939-59," in 
Volume I of Surveys of Economic Theory by the American Economic 
Association and Royal Economic Society, (3 volumes; London: Macmillan, 
1966), pp. 195-196. 
CHAPTER III 
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: A CALCULUS OF 
EFFICIENCY FOR PUBLIC GOODS 
Introduction 
This is the last of the theoretical chapters which are aimed at 
preparing the grounds for economic analysis of outdoor recreation. 
Chapter II was a discussion of public goods and of the market 
failure in their efficient production and consumption. The present 
Chapter explores cost-benefit analysis as a technique for achieving 
efficiency in the production and consumption of public goods. The 
Chapter compares the nature of efficiency in private and public goods, 
discusses the enumeration and evaluation of costs and benefits, analyzes 
the question of criteria and the rate of discount, and finally explores 
the relation of consumer's surplus and option demand to cost-benefit 
analysis. 
Efficiency Criteria in Private and Public Goods 
In the production of a private good efficiency is achieved when 
the marginal cost of production is equated with the marginal revenue. 
Whereas MC reflects technical efficiency1 , the MR is a measure of 
individual preferences: hence, the idea that what is technically effi-
cient should be humanly desirable is the theoretical rationale behind this 
1cost curves as the inverses of production curves, trace the 
path of maximum e:fficiency. 
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notion of efficiency. Thus, when individuals cast their dollar votes 
for the production of certain goods which satisfy their tastes, they 
have also decided upon the allocation of resources for production. 
In the case of public goods equating MR and MC is impossible. 
The "jointness in supply" and the "non-exclusion" characteristics of 
public goods is another way of stating that for public goods MC and 
MR do not exist.
2 
The need for another criterion for efficiency in the 
case of public goods is thus apparent. 
The task of arriving at a concrete criterion for the evaluation 
of public good, however, is plagued by the inherent illusiveness of the 
concept of public goods. 
The categories of goods included under this name are numerous. 
They include all the cases of market failure, and market fails for a 
variety of reasons. Thus, it is difficult to find common attributes, 
which are essential for purposes of analysis, among the goods whose 
. d . d 3 existence lS ue to varle reasons. The two attributes of "jointness 
in supply" and "non-exclusion" are good enough for distinguishing public 
goods, but do not help in their analysis. 
The application of a concrete criterion of efficiency for 
goods which are of such an illusive nature is logically inconsistent. 
It is only logical that the criterion should vary as the characteristics 
of the goods change. A case by case study of public goods is not only 
2Th . · . 1 b d . Ch II lS polnt lS e a orate upon ln apter • 
3 
See Chapter II. 
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palatable on this ground but also on the grounds that the benefits from 
them inure to a wide class of individuals. 
Cost-benefit analysis as a technique for evaluation is well 
suited for the assessment of public goods. The technique shares the 
same illusive nature as is attributable to public goods, There are 
as many cost-benefit analyses as there are applications of the technique. 
In economic evaluation of public goods, it is important that 
one takes a long view, in the sense of looking at repercussions in the 
farther as well as nearer future and a wide view, in the sense of allowing 
for side effects of many kinds. Put differently, one must enumerate and 
evaluate all relevant costs and benefits in the case of public goods. 
The technique that performs this task of enumeration and evaluation of 
costs and benefits, in an exhaustive manner, is called cost-benefit. 
analysis, It differs from the profitability criterion used for the 
assessment of private goods by entrepreneurs only in this exhaustive 
sense. The entrepreneur goes about the enumeration and evaluation of 
his business venture in a selective manner. True to his pursuit of 
cost minimization, he not only tries to minimize the cost in quantity 
but also in categories. For example, safety standards and devices 
which will decrease harmful emissions in automobiles, are two categories 
of costs that have been avoided by the car industry. This calculus of 
efficiency for public goods, cost-benefit analysis, attempts to minimize 
the cost by evaluating the alternatives, and not by neglecting certain 
categories of costs. 
Speaking differently, while decision rules of the theory of the 
firm aim at profit maximization, decision rules of benefit-cost analysis 
seek to maximize "public benefits" or "general welfare" within the 
area of responsibility. Because of this exhaustive search for costs 
and benefits, in the area of public resource development there is no 
substitute for cost-benefit as a technique of analysis.
4 
Another important difference between cost-benefit analysis 
and the profitability calculation of a private entrepreneur is that 
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the entrepreneur actually sells the output and buys the inputs in the 
market. Therefore those who receive the benefits of the investment 
actually pay the costs incurred. On the other hand, the general cost-
benefit approach does not require that the beneficiaries pay any or 
all of the costs. In cost-benefit analysis, so long as the benefits 
incurred are greater than the costs, it is of minor importance as to 
who the recipients of the benefits are or who bears the cost. 
Measuring of Benefits and Costs 
Generally costs and benefits are divided into four categories: 
(1) Primary benefits and costs, (2) Secondary benefits and costs, (3) 
Externalities, and (4) Intangible benefits and costs. These four 
categories of benefits and costs are not as distinct as they appear to 
be. For example, the line drawn between intangibles and externalities 
is not very clear. Nor is the distinction between primary and secondary 
benefits (or costs) very obvious. 
4s.v. Ciriacy-Wantrup, "Philosophy and Objectives of Watershed 
Development," in Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource Development, 
ed. by Stephen C. Smith and Emery N. Castle, (Iowa State University Press, 
1965). 
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Externalities can in turn be divided into two groups of real 
and pecuniary. Externalities are considered real when they result in 
shifts in production possibility curves. Pecuniary externalities give 
rise to side-effects via prices of products and factors. In essence 
pecuniary externalities result in shifts in costs and revenue curves. 
A few examples will suffice to clarify these definitions. Zvi Griliches 
5 estimated the social rate of return on hybrid corn to be 700 percent. 
However, as he is the first one to point out, the hybrid corn has had 
external effect on the development of hybrid sorghum and hybrid poultry. 
These effects were probably felt in two ways: (1) the research in 
hybrid corn, provided short cuts which resulted in reducing the time 
span in which the research in sorghum and poultry bore fruit, (2) the 
spectacular success of hybrid corn helped reduce farmer's resistance 
to new technology and thus accelerated the rate of production of those 
crops. In technical language, one can say that the development of 
hybrid corn caused shifts in the production possibility curves for sor-
ghum and poultry. Those shifts are examples in real external economies. 
An example of real external diseconomies is when construction 
of a reservoir by the upstream authority of a river basin necessitates 
more dredging by the down stream authority. An example of pecuniary 
external economies would be when the improvement of a road leads to 
greater profitability of the garages and restaurants on the road, employ-
ment of more labor by them, higher rent payments ro the relevant landlords, 
5zvi r,riliches, Research Costs and Social Returns: Hybrid 
Corn and Related Innovations," The Journal of Political Economy (Oct. 1958), 
pp. 419-431. 
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6 etc. The effect of the first kind (technical) is real, the effect of 
the second type is of a distributional and transfer nature. On the above 
grounds, real externalities should be included and the pecuniary should 
be excluded from the calculation in cost-benefit analysis. 
A needed modification in these generalizations about the 
exclusion of pecuniary benefits and costs is when there is unemployment. 
In a situation of unemployment the benefits occuring to the unemployed 
resources cannot be considered merely distributional. When an increase 
in employment is not at a cost of reduction of employment elsewhere, 
the gain in employment should be included in the benefits. 
The distinction between primary and secondary benefits or 
costs is not very clear either. 
7 
Arthur Mass has perhaps made the best 
analytical distinction between primary and secondary benefits. To 
him the word benefit (and the word cost) has no meaning in itself, but 
only in association with an objective; and the objectives are either 
economic efficiency or objectives other than economic efficiency. The 
benefits (and costs) associated with economic efficiency are primary 
and those associated with other than economic efficiency are secondary. 
The use of an example will best illustrate the meaning of 
primary and secondary costs and benefits. In the case of irrigation 
6A. Prest and Ralph Turvey, "Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey," 
Surveys of Economic Theory, Vol. III by American Economic Association 
and Royal Economic Soc. (London: MacMillan, 1966). p. 160. 
7Arthur Maass, "Benefit-Cost Analysis: Its Relevance to 
Public Investment Decisions," Quarterly Journal of Economics, (May, 1966), 
208-209. 
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water the primary benefit is the value obtained by working out what the 
water is worth to farmers as the excess of the value of the increased 
output which the irrigation makes possible. The primary cost is the 
cost of the dam in terms of land, labor, capital and raw material, 
plus the cost of all the farmers' increased inputs. The secondary benefits 
may include the increase in employment (assuming that unemployment 
exists prior to the project's construction). The secondary cost is any 
medical or training cost that might be needed in order to make the 
labor force employable. Those who are in favor of strict economic 
efficiency as an objective will exclude the secondary benefits and costs 
from their calculation in cost-benefit analysis. Ciriacy-Wantrup, and 
9 w Prest and Turvey are in favor of their exclusion. Arthur Maass is 
in favor of their inclusion. The author finds it hard to find arguments 
in favor of economic efficiency as the sole objective in project 
evaluation. 
Enumeration of Benefits and Costs 
Cost-benefit analysts agree that purely pecuniary benefits 
should not be allowed for, but that all others (internal or external, 
direct or indirect, tangible or intangible) should ideally be included. 11 
The next important question is how should they be measured? At this 
point Musgrave's distinction between the intermediate social good (a 
8 
cit., 19. op. page 
9 cit., 161. op. p~e 
10 
cit., 211 op. page 
11 
and cit. Prest Turvey, op. 
good vhich enters into the production of further output), and final 
social goods (which is ready for consumption) is of assistance in 
differentiating the cases that are measurable from the ones that are 
not.
12 
It was noted in Chapter II that in the case of social 
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goods since their use by any one consumer does not interfere with that 
by another--that is, they are non rivals in consumption, it would be 
inefficient to make consumption contingent on price payment, even where 
exclusion could he readily applied. Thus, entrance fees are inappro-
priate for an uncrmvded park--people will pay the fee and still come 
in large numbers. The fact that exclusion cannot be frequently applied, 
or at great cost only, further strengthens the conclusion that the 
auction system of the market is not available to evaluate the benefits. 
A political process is needed, and this involves tax and eA~enditure 
determination through the voting system. 
Such is the case for social goods of the final or consumer 
goods type, some examples of which are public parks and other recreational 
resorts, or the T.V. spectacle of moon-landing. In all the cases of 
final public goods, the costs can be measured but the benefits will have 
to be stipulated. This stipulation of benefit will differ from one good 
to another. In the case of outdoor recreation, the stipulation of bene-
fits is carried out by measuring the cost of the complementary private 
goods, one component of which is travel cost. This problem is specifically 
of Public 
p. 800. 
12Richard A. Musgrave, "Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Theory 
Finance," Journal of Economic Literature, (September, 1969), 




dealt with in the final chapters of this study. Even if the evaluation 
of benefits is arbitrary--when all methods of evaluation fail--it is 
still better than no evaluation. The analysis may provide a test for 
how high evaluation must be to justify the outlay. 
In the case of intermediate public goods, goods that go into the 
production of other public or private goods, however, the situation is 
more manageable. Here, usually the benefits are reflected in price 
change, or are made calculable with reference to price. Thus, the 
benefits from the development of hybrid seeds
13 
and the benefits 
from irrigation may be measured in terms of increased agricultural 
output; flood control results in cost-saving since damage to capital 
. . d d 14 b d d . assets or resources 1s avo1 e ; etter roa s re uce automot1ve costs 
15 
and save trucking time, which can be valued; public health measures 
16 
reduce remedial care costs; investment in education raises earning 
17 power, and so forth. 
13An excellent example of cost-benefit analysis of investment 
in the development of hybrid corn is by Zvi Griliches, "Research Costs 
and Social Returns: Hybrid Corn and Related Innovation," The Journal 
of Political Economy, (October, 1958). 
14 John V. Krutilla, 11 An Economic Approach to Coping With Flood 
Damage," Water Resources Research, (Second Quarter, 1966). 
15H. Mohring, "Land Values and the Measurement of Highway 
Benefits," Journal of Political Econoll!Y, (June, 1961). 
16Herbert E. Klarman, "Syphilis Control Programs," in Measuring 
Benefits of Government Investment, ed. by Robert Dorfman (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institute, 1963). 
17
B.A. Weisbrod, "Education and Investment in Human Capital," 
Journal of Political Economy, Supplement (October, 1962). 
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The intermediate social goods have the same characteristics 
of non-exclusion19 as have the final goods. But the non-exclusion, 
here, pertains to producers rather than consumers. Since an intermediate 
public good enters the production of a final private good--the irrigation 
water is used by many farmers--the benefits of such a good can be 
measured in terms of the market price of this final private good. 
Because evaluation does not pose great problems in the case of inter-
mediate social goods, their cost-benefit analysis has been most success-
ful, some examples of which have already been cited. 
Limitations of Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Although cost-benefit analysis is best suited for the analysis 
of public goods, by necessity it draws upon a variety of traditional 
sections of economics whose subject of investigation has been mainly 
private goods. This reliance upon the traditional economics is heaviest 
in the case of final public goods where costs and benefits are arcane. 
The result is that cost-benefit analysis provides no substitute for the 
basic problem of evaluation in the case of final social goods. All it 
can do is to expedite efficient decision-making after the basic problem 
of evaluation is solved. 
In a social investment it is quite possible for the costs to 
be borne by one group and the benefits enjoyed by another--social 
investment is often an instrument of income distribution. But cost-
19o . 1 . M ' . 1 . r non-r~va , ~n usgrave s ter~no ogy, op. c~t. 
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benefit analysis as a calculus for that investment is incapable of 
measuring the costs and the benefits that are intrinsic in the redis-
tribution. This blindness of cost-benefit analysis to income redistri-
bution should be enough of a warning signal to the applicant. Otherwise 
what may be achieved by this instrument of efficiency may be totally 
undesirable because of inequity. 
If investment decisions are large relative to a given economy, 
and the constellation of relative prices and outputs are likely to 
change as a result of them, the standard technique of cost-benefit 
analysis is likely to fail, and some general equilibrium technique would 
be more suitable. This shortcoming occurs because costs and profits are 
calculated on the basis of prevailing constellation of input and output 
prices. A change in the constellation of prices makes it virtually 
impossible, because of uncertainty, to attach values to costs and 
benefits. Thus, a project of the size of Aswan Darn is likely to have 
profound effect on the structure of prices, which makes it impossible 
for costs and benefits of the project to be measured. 
Criteria in Cost-Benefit Analysis 
An investment, be it private or social, yields its output 
through time. If the undertaking is a highway, the output is found by 
estimating the number of passenger-car miles, truck miles, and bus miles 
to be traveled on it in each year. If the investment is in public parks 
for recreational use, the output is the attendance that the park will 
receive on an annual basis, etc. In general, regardless of the nature 
of investment, there will be a time during which it will yield its fruits. 
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We have already discussed the problems concerning the evaluation 
of the yields and the costs that are associated with them. In this 
section our major task is how to compare the costs and benefits which 
occur over time" 
Among the many criteria that have been proposed for evaluating 
the profitability of investment projects, the payback, the discounted 
present value and the internal rate of return will be discussed in 
this section. 
The Payback, Payout, or Payoff Period 
The payback period is a practical rule of thumb criterion, 
and because of this, it is widely used. However, it is the least 
acceptable of all the criteria by economists. 
Payout period is the number of years which is required to 
accumulate earnings sufficient to cover the costs of a project. In 
the more sophisticated version, the costs and returns are discounted 
to find the payback period of a project. 
The main shortcomings of this criterion lies in the fact 
that the earning capacity of an investment may far exceed its payoff 
period. Under this criterion, a short-lived investment with a short 
payoff period is preferable to an investment that has a longer payoff 
but at the same time a longer life. 
In the less sophisticated version of this criterion, the time 
pattern of receipts and costs are not considered. A project with higher 
return in the beginning is not differentiated from one with lower 
returns during that period. 
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The Present Value Criterion 
The present value criterion states that a project should be 
undertaken when the present value of its benefit stream is greater than 
the present value of its cost stream. Since the benefits and costs 
of an investment are spread over time, the use of present value makes 
comparable benefits and costs which accrue at different points in time. 
The process of discounting in the use of present value is a process 
of adjusting future benefits and costs in order to give them an 
appropriate weight before adding them up. 
If (b
1
, b2 , •••• , bn) is a stream of benefits and (c1
, 
en) represents a stream of costs, then their respective . . ' 
present values are as follows: 
(1) Present Value of Benefits 
1, 2, .... , n. 
(2) Present Value of Costs 









(1 + i) t 
for t 
In the above formulas i stands for discount rates and t indi-
cates periods of time. Equation (1) reduces future benefits to their 
present worth, and equation (2) does the same thing to the costs. 
The amount to which future benefits and costs are reduced depends on 
two things, the rate of discount and how far into the future those values 
lie. A zero rate of discount implies equal weighting of benefits and 
costs through time. A positive discount rate implies that benefits and 
costs in future are weighted less than those occuring at present or 
close to it. The larger the discount factor the greater will be the 
reduction in the streams of benefits and costs. A negative discount 
factor carries the obvious implication that the future benefits and 
20 
costs are worth more than those of the present. 
The Internal Rate of Return 
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Criterion can best be stated in terms of its formula, using 
the same symbols as before: 
n 
t=O (1 + r)t 
n 
L: 
t=O (1 +r) t 
(3) 
The internal rate of return r, has replaced i in equations (1) and (2), 
and is the only unknown in this formula. It is the rate of discount 
which equates the present value of the streams of benefits to that of costs. 
20we have mentioned all the three possibilities of the rate 
of discount (zero positive and negative) for the sake of logical continuity. 
In practice the rate of discount is positive. This practice is based 
upon two reasons, one of which is a value judgement and the other one 
is objective and conveys technical efficiency. (1) That present benefits 
are preferred to equal future benefits, especially if they are sufficiently 
removed in time, is a value judgement. (2) That a given investment must 
be compared with other investments also capable of yielding deferred 
benefits. If there exists an alternative investment capable of yielding 
a benefit of, say, 1.10 units of benefit a year hence for a present cost 
of 1 unit, then the given investment, to be justified, must be capable 
of yielding at least as much. This proposition is a straight-forward 
statement of technical efficiency and is independent of any value 
judgement as to time preference. 
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According to the internal rate of return criterion, a project is 
viable if its internal rate of return exceeds an appropriate rate of 
. 1 d' 21 socla lscount. 
The internal rate of return measures the internal profitability 
of an investment,
22 
and it is only by the condition that it should exceed 
an appropriate interest rate that it finds its linkage with the outside 
world, i.e., the capital market. 
Sometimes, the internal rate of return is not differentiated 
from the marginal efficiency of investment or capital, and the two 
23 names are used synonymously. 
James Ramsey24 distinguishes between the internal rate of return 
and the marginal efficiency of capital and traces their confusion to as 
far back as Keynes. According to Ramsey, in competitive equilibrium--
when investment is pushed to the point where the marginal efficiency 
of capital equals the interest rate--the internal rate of return and 
the marginal efficiency of capital have the same value. But when firms 
are facing discrete investment projects--when investment cannot be 
pushed, except incidentally, to the point where the marginal efficiency 
of capital equals the interest rate--the marginal efficiency and the 
21The social rate of discount will be discussed in the following 
section. 
22william J. Baumol, Economic Theory and Operations Analysis, 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965), p. 440. 
23rbid., pp. 439, 440, 441, etc. 
24 
Ramsey, James B. "The Marginal Efficiency of Capital, the Internal 
Rate of Return, and Net Present Value: An Analysis of Investment 
Criteria," Journal of Political Economy, September/October, 1970. 
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internal rate will differ. This result is due to the fact that firms 
are unable to vary their level of investment expenditures continuously. 
Since cost-benefit analysis is a technique of evaluation in cases of 
other than competitive equilibrium, the marginal efficiency of capital 
is ruled out as an acceptable criterion. 
Comparison of Present Value and Internal 
Rate of Return 
The payoff period as a criterion completely lacks academic 
b "1" 25 respecta 1 1ty. Economists have not voiced a unanimous opinion on 
the remaining two, i.e., the present value and the internal rate of 
return. Baumol has called the internal rate of return a "contrived 
n
26 d h d"'f bit of flunmery, an Seagraves as come to its c. ense and against 
h f 1 
. . 27 t e use o present va ue cr1ter1on. It must be stated, however, 
that the two criteria are not completely separate and with equal time 
span the ranking of projects with either of the two criteria amounts 
h h
. 28 
to t e same t 1ng. That is the reason that no author, while favoring 
one, has rejected the other completely. 
25 Turvey, op. cit., p. 93. 
26 
Baumol, op. cit., p. 444. 
27J. A. Seagraves, "More on the Social Rate of Discount," 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, (August, 1970), p. 435. 
28 
James Ramsey, op. cit., p. 1017. 
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We have already seen that the internal rate of return is free 
from the choice of an interest rate but the present value is dependent 
upon the selection of an interest rate. This distinction has led Turvey 
to conclude, erroneously, however, that the internal rate of return 
"enables us to choose between investments without using a discount rate, 
either explicitly or implicitly. Hence the criterion is wrong so long 
as we continue to value an immediate gain more than an equal but more 
remote gain."
29 
A look at the formula (3) for the internal rate of 
return will make it abundantly clear that discounting is involved in 
the process of finding the internal rate of return, only the rate of 
discount is chosen in such a way as to make "the present value of the 
series of annuities given by the returns expected from the capital-asset 
during its life just equal to its supply price. "
30 
As we can see in the case of internal rate of return, the rate 
at which future costs and returns are discounted is not optional--is an 
unknown to be found--but the future costs and benefits are subject to 
discounting. 
The argument favoring the use of present value rests on the 
following points: 
29op. cit., p- 97. 
30 John Haynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest 
and Honey, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1964). 
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a. The equation for the internal rate of return is an nth 
degree polynomial and may have as many as n roots or solutions. The 
implication being that we may not end up with one internal rate of 
return but with n rates of return. This situation arises when some 
figures in the income stream are negative, i.e., losses have incurred. 
Many authors have tried to come up with a solution but as Seagraves, 
Ramsey and Baumol show,their attempts have been doomed to failure. 
An illustration of this failure is provided by the following 
diagram. The abscissa in Figure 2 measures the rates of discount (i) 
d h d · 1 1 (v) • 





The net ~esent value curve has several points of intersection with the 
ordinate implying that there are several (not just one) rates of discount 
which equate the present value of stream of benefits and costs. 
n 




for t 0 1 • . • n 
t is periods of time, b is benefits, c is cost and i is the discount 
rate. 
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b. The calculation of the internal rate of return rests on 
the assumption that all the flows of receipts are reinvested. Ralph 
Turvey32 has likened the use of the internal rate of return to the 
realization of a "Stalinist maximand", where time preference and social 
discount rates are irrelevant and a grim determination sees to it that 
all the surpluses are ploughed back to ensure the realization of the 
largest stock of assets at the end of economic horizon. When it is 
not certain whether all the surpluses will be ploughed back, then the 
use of the internal rate of return is not justified. 
c. In the case of mutually exclusive projects, the internal 
rate of return and the present value give conflicting answers. Figure 3 
shows two mutually exclusive projects a and b. As before the abscissa 
shows rates of discount and the ordinate is the net discounted value 
of returns. At an interest rate of R percent, project a has a greater 
present value (RT is greater than RS), but project b has a greater 
internal rate of return (OB is greater than OA). If the objective is 
to increase the wealth of the enterprise then the greater present value 
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32
Turvey, op. cit., p. 96. 
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d. Where there are limitatiornto the borrowing ability, i.e., 
where capital is rationed, by definition there is not a unique rate of 
interest but several of them. In such a case the availability of more 
funds is conditioned upon the payment of higher interest. Since the 
application of the internal rate of return presupposes one rate of 
discount for comparison, the existence of several rates of discount 
makes the application of internal rate of return impossible. As for 
present value, Baurnol has suggested the use of integer programming to 
counter the problem of multiplicity in the rates of discount. 33 
Problems Surrounding the Selection of a Discount Rate 
An act of investment requires the allocation of current 
resources, which have alternative productive uses, to an activity 
whose benefits will accrue in the future. To add up the benefits, one 
must establish rates of exchange between benefits at different times, 
that is, weights to be assigned to the benefits before adding them 
together. The same procedure must be followed for costs. 
We have already noted the reasons behind the establishment of 
such rates of exchange. The brief discussion here is on whether these 
rates of discount or exchange should be different for private goods 
versus public goods. Put differently, what is the difference between 
the social and private time preference? 
Pigou in his The Economics of Welfare
34 
was the first one to 
claim a difference between the private and social time preference, and 
33op. cit., pp. 448-453. 
34 (London: Macmillan, 1932), pp. 24-30. 
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attribute the difference to the "defective telescopic faculty" on the 
part of the individuals. This deficiency in foresight will result in 
inadequate provisions for the welfare of unborn generations. The 
up-shot of this line of argument is that social rate of discount must 
be smaller than the private rate of discount. 
As a corollary to this line of reasoning, social discrimination 
and the cries of the minorities can be interpreted as having resulted 
from the lack of foresight on the part of past generations. Thus, many 
remedial investments like urban renewal, the establishment of educational 
institutions for Blacks or Indians, low cost housing, etc., can be 
discounted at smaller rates of discounts, than the one used in 
similar investments for affluent Whites or other social investments 
which are not of remedial nature. 
The opposite view that there ought to be no difference between 
the social and private time preference is expressed by many. William 
35 
Baumol, after a change of heart, has joined Harglin Eckstein and Tullock 
in arguing that an increase in investment constitutes a redistribution 
of income from present to future generations. They further argue, that 
this redistribution has had the opposite result of what might be called 
a Robin Hood effect; it has taken from the poor and given to the rich. 
Simply stated, their argument can be concluded as saying: "Why should 
I give up part of my income to help support someone else with an income 
36 
several times my own." 
35william J. Baumol, "On the Social Rate of Discount," American 
Economic Review, September, 1968, p. 799. 
36
Ibid., p. 800. 
40 
It is true that an act of investment involves a redistribution of 
income from present to future generations, but among the future genera-
tion some receive a lions share of this income and some none. In 
other words, the present inequities in the distribution of income are 
perpetuated, and at times even worsened, by this intragenerational trans-
fer of income. If the judgement that inequities call for remedial actions 
is accepted, then the case is made for the application of a lower rate 
of discount in investments which are of remedial nature. 
37 
Fritz Machlup is of the opinion that the case for public 
investment should be made by full accounting for all social benefits, 
and not by lowering the rate of discount. But it is worth mentioning 
that the extra benefits in remedial investments are mostly of an 
intangible nature--providing more education opportunities for Blacks 
adds to national unity--which does not reflect itself in a cost-benefit 
ratio. A lower rate of discount is the only way to attach importance 
to these benefits. Hence, under this line of thinking, the rate of 
discount for two recreational facilities, one in a strictly White 
neighborhood and one in a Black neighborhood, should be lower for the 
latter. 
Other cases where a lower rate of discount commands itself 
is in infrastructure in the lesser developed countries. Unless a major 
restriction in current consumption is enforced and a sacrifice is made, 
37comments on Weisbrod's paper. op. cit., p. 157. 
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stagnation may prevail and the future generations will be as impoverished 
38 
as the present. 
Even if an agreement is reached on the general promise that the 
social rate of discount must be lower than the private rate of discount, 
the amount by which the social rate of discount should be lower and the 
multitude39 of private rates with which it should be compared still pose 
problems. To tackle this problem is like "trying to unscramble an omelet 
and no one has yet invented a uniquely superior way of doing it."
40 
Risk and market imperfections are generally offered as the main 
elements behind the existence of multiple rates in the market 
41 sector. One way of coming up with one rate which will represent a 
market rate of return is to take a particular rate and make the 
appropriate adjustments in it. Seagraves has taken the corporate 
bonds and adjusted it for the elements of risk, taxes, savings by 
consumers and inflation. We can do no better than to present his method 
here: 
38This case is also recognized by Baumol, op. cit., p. 801. 
39Time deposits and government bonds, for example, yield 
different rates of return. 
40 Prest and Turvey, op. cit., p. 172. 
41 h A "C . . f S . 1 I " Kennet J. rrow, rlterla or ocla nvestment, Water 
Resources Research, First Quarter, 1965. p. 1-8. 
"Adding Up Separate Effects .--When one combines 
these separate adjustments, positive ones for risk 
and taxes, and negative ones for savings by con-
sumers and inflation, what is the resulting social 
rate of discount? Again, to avoid argument, let us 
assume a range for Class A corporate bond yields 
from 6.7 to 7.2 per cent at the beginning of 1969. 
Corporate, rather than treasury, bond yields are 
used because the income from treasury bonds is not 
taxed in some states. 
Basic factors affecting Social rate of discount 
the social rate of Lower Upper 
discount limit limit 
(percentages) 
Yield on Class A 
corporate bonds 6.7 7.2 
Risk premia for govern-
ment portfolios +2.0 +4.0 
Corporate profit and 
property taxes +4.3 +6.0 
Marginal productivity 
of capital 13.0 17.2 
Adjustment for added 
savings -1.5 -1.5 
Social rate of discount 
in money terms 11.5 15. 7 
Adjustment for expected 
inflation -3.5 -1.5 
Social rate of discount 
in real terms 8.0 13.2 
I am not saying that this is the best way to 
calculate the social rate of discount. Hargerger's 
suggestions for handling taxes and added savings 
merit attention. The matters of risk premia and 
expected inflation deserve more study. The above 
ranges 12-16 per cent in money terms, and 8-13 
per cent in real terms, probably cover the 
social rates of discount that most economists 
would have recommended to our government in 
1968 and 1969. My own estimate in February, 
1969 was 7.2 per cent for bond yields, plus 3 
42 
per cent for risk, plus 4.3 per cent for taxes, 
less 1.5 per cent for the lower rate earned on 
added savings, less 3 per cent for expected in--
flation, which results in a real social rate of 
discount of 10 per cent. As of December, 1969, 
with bond yields of about 8. 7 per cent quite 
common and the expected rate of inflation 
unchanged, I would have to adjust my estimate 
of the4 ~ocial rate of discount up to 11.5 per cent." 
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Perhaps the application of several rates of discount is the most 
rational course of action to follmv. It certainly gives the decision 
maker a wider range of choice and reduces the analysts subjectivity 
in having to choose one rate of discount. 
Consumer's Surplus and Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Consumer's surplus is an ideal tool for measuring the benefits 
in terms of increased volume when it is brought about by a difference 
in preproject and post project prices. Figure 4 presents the 
consumers surplus for a commodity which has experienced a reduction 
in price from P
0 
to P1 • Thus, in the example cited previously, the 
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Although used frequently, economists have not been at ease 
with the use of consumer's surplus. The source of this uneasiness is 
a set of assumptions upon which the notion of consumer's surplus rests. 
These major assumptions can be briefly stated as follows: 
(1) Consumer's surplus analysis is valid only when the 
marginal utility of real income is constant. A 
constant marginal utility of real income means that 
the quantities of money paid for a commodity are assumed 
to be proportional to the quantities of satisfaction 
derived from it. 
(2) Consumer's surplus analysis does not take account of 
changes in income distribution caused by the action 
or actions being analyzed. In other words, the income 
effect is assumed away. 
(3) Consumer's surplus analysis is partial equilibrium in 
nature, and does not take account of the general-
equilibrium consequences of the actions whose effects 
are being studied. A corollary of this assumption 
is that the demand for a particular commodity is 
independent of prices and quantities of other goods. 
Based on the above assumptions, consumer's surplus sterns from 
the basic premise that value in use is greater than value in exchange, 
and the difference is measured by consumers surplus. m1ile the value 
in exchange is determined by the market, the value in use is determined 
by one's willingness to pay that amount beyond which he will forego 
consumption of the commodity in question. Only a monopolist can 
extract from an individual the total amount which he is willing to pay 
for a commodity. That is why the consumer's surplus has always been 
associated with the existence of a first degree monopoly; that which 
will enable one to capture the consumer's surplus. 
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The measurement of the consumer's surplus for the purposes 
of making decisions about social investments is not necessarily tied 
to any attempt to recapture some or all of these surpluses or benefits 
through taxes or a system of charges. In social investments all attempts 
are focused on the quantification of consumer's surplus as a measure 
of a project's worth to the consumers. All practical approximations 
of consumer's surplus are, in one form or another, of the area under 
the demand curve as the price drops from its preproject to its post-
project level. In our analysis of recreation, we will attempt to measure 
the benefits which accrue to the consumers from a recreational facility. 
However, first we will have to make sure that the notion of consumers 
surplus is cleared of some of the theoretical objections that it has 
entailed thus far. 
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Professor Harberger finds that most of the objections 
raised against the consumer's surplus are cases of misplaced emphasis; 
most of the objections raised against the consumer's surplus can be 
more strenuously raised against the concept of GNP and other national 
product accounts, yet the notion of consumer's surplus has received 
a far lesser degree of acceptance than that which has been given the 
concepts of a national account. 
Harberger in his article finds that the concept of consumer's 
surplus incorporates a greater degree of subtlety of economic analysis 
than does national income methodology. Here we will confine ourselves 
with the basic conclusions which Harberger has derived: 
43 
Arnold C. Harberger, "Three Basic Postalates for Applied 
Welfare Economics," Journal of Economic Literature, September, 1971. 
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(a) The constancy of the marginal utility of income is not 
essential for the validity of consumer's surplus 
measure of welfare. 
(b) That the consumer's surplus does not take account of 
changes in income distribution caused by an action, 
although correct, need not bother us. This is because 
of the fact that many actions, suited for cost-benefit 
analysis, have infinitismal effects on income distribu-
tion. 
(c) The claim that consumer's surplus analysis is partial-
equilibrium in nature is totally invalid on a theoretical 
level. 
(d) That consumer's surplus analysis though valid for 
small changes, is not so for large changes is refuted 
on several grounds all of which involve mathematical 
derivations, which we have not bothered to discuss here. 
The notion of consumer's surplus is crucial in measuring the 
benefits from outdoor recreation. Before applying it we had to rid 
the notion from some of the theoretical objections raised against it. 
It should be further noted that the expenditure on recreation is usually 
a small percentage of one's total income, so that even if the marginal 
utility of income changes, the change is negligible. 
Option Demand 
The notion of option demand44 is closely associated with 
that of consumer's surplus, and that is the reason for the brief 
44For its original statement, see Burton Weisbrod, "Collective-
Consumption Services of Individual Consumer's Goods," Quarterly Journal 
of Economics, August, 1964, pp. 471-477. 
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discussion of it here. Option demand is the demand by certain indivi-
duals who may not desire a good now, but who would be willing to pay 
(option price) for the option of being able to acquire the goods, at 
a given price, in the future. In effect, option demand is consumer's 
45 
surplus measured in the future. In the case of individuals who are 
certain about their demand for a good in the future, the option price 
and the expected consumer's surplus are the same thing. 46 For this 
paper, it will be assumed that consumer's surplus includes option 
demand, and the latter will not be measured separately. 
Conclusions 
Public goods do not lend themselves to generalization quite as 
readily as do private goods. The economics of public goods are 
largely unexplored due to the above difficulty. Hence, in analyzing 
public goods, it is best to study each good separately. In addition, 
since the benefits from public goods inure to large groups of people, 
their case by case study is even more essential. 
Cost-benefit analysis is ideally suited for this case by case 
study of public goods, whereby it is best to enumerate and evaluate 
all the costs and benefits associated with a 'public good,' or with a 
'public bad,' as the case might be. 
45Professor Olson privately said that the option demand boils 
down to consumer's surplus. 
46 Charles J. Cicchetti and A. Myrick Freeman, III, "Option Demand 
and Consumer Surplus: Further Comment," Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
(October, 1971). 
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While it is true that no two economists studying one subject 
will come up with the same conclusions, the dissimilarity of results 
is evermore critical in cost-benefit analysis. For here the avenues 
for individual biases to creep into an analysis are many. The 
enumeration and evaluation of benefits and costs, the imputation of 
benefits and costs (in cases of lack of market evaluation or adjust-
ments in those evaluations as the circumstances might call for), and 
the choice of the rate of discount, all are avenues for subjectivity. 
Whereas, the internal rate of return criterion bears a hedge against 
the last source of bias (namely the choice of the discount rate), the 
analyst has ample opportunity to select his own rate of discount for 
the criterion that is most favored for cost-benefit analysis--the present 
value criterion. 
As for the choice of a criterion, the analyst is further cautioned 
that the ultimate decision for the preference of one criterion over the 
other cannot be made in abstraction. Hence, the nature of the maximand 
and the relevant constraint will have to be considered. When the objec-
tive is the maximization of the present value, the use of the present 
value is indispensible; but when the objective is the maximization of the 
rate of growth of assets and all the flows of receipts are reinvested as 
they accrue, then the use of the internal rate of return is needed. 
While social investments serve as instruments of income distribu-
tion, cost-benefit analysis is poorly equipped to analyze the costs and 
benefits of such distributions. The analyst will do well to be informed 
of this blind eye of his instrument. 
L 
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The objective in a cost-benefit analysis is to come up with 
a measure of the worth of a social investment from the point of view 
of the consumer. Consumer's surplus presents itself as a good measuring 
rod of consumer's willingness to pay. Since consumer's surplus will 
be a basic tool for the assessment of benefits from recreation, its 
use is justified and is not subjected to major theoretical objections. 
Now being equipped with some tools of analysis, they will be 
brought to bear upon the economic analysis of recreation which is 
discussed in the ensuing chapter. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE NATURE OF BENEFITS AND THEIR MEASUREMENT 
IN PUBLIC OUTDOOR RECREATION 
Definition of Outdoor Recreation 
Outdoor recreation in this study encompasses a whole host of 
activities, which include picnicking, fishing, sightseeing, canoeing, 
pleasure walking or riding, and camping, etc. They are activities 
that take place in the dutdoors for the purposes of pleasure and 
relaxation; as such they are the antithesis of work or activities 
which are for the pursuit of a gainful trade. 
The Need for Recreation 
The need for recreation is a biological one. It is perhaps best 
expressed by a leading authority in the field. 
"As an illustration of the kind of problem 
we are creating for ourselves in our new mood of 
independence from natural restrictions, let us 
take one which we share with the rest of the 
animal kingdom, at least the other vertebrates 
with whom we have most in common so far as bodily 
structure and needs are concerned. Success in 
living and survival requires not only nourishment 
~ut beautiful co-ordination of senses, nervous 
system and muscles. Call it play, recreation or 
training, the activity of" cat, beaver, colt or 
bird is not all given to the search for food. 
Much of it is spontaneous activity that helps 
these animals keep in shape for more serious 
business. Man is no exception. Where inclination 
and common sense fail to convince us, we have 
statistics as well as the word of psychiatrists 
and eminent heart specialists to prove it. A 
host of Eenalties ranging from delinquency through 
mental sluggishness to unnecessary physical 
disabilities, plague us in almost exact proportion 
to the lack of proper facilities for wholesome 
recreation. 
Sound recreation must be both physical and 
mental. It also requires space, space that is 
suitable not only in area but in quality. The 
present wholesale movement from city to suburb 
is mute evidence for the need and craving for 
elbow room, despite the burden it imposes in the 
way of tiring and hazardous daily travel to and 
from work. Nor is there any compulsion upon the 
developers who profit immensely by building of 
the suburbs to set aside suitable and generous areas 
for recreation. In their eagerness to get the most 
out of every square foot of land, they often bull-
doze out every tree that might soften the starkness 
of mass housing and level off any irregularities 
of surface that might add a bit of interest and 
relief. If there is a point at which private 
business becomes a matter of public concern, it 
is being daily1exceeded in unplanned and irresponsible 
urban sprawl." 
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Coming as it does from an emminent ecoglogist, the argument not only 
defines the need for recreation but also heeds public responsibility 
toward its fulfillment. The latter point is important enough to 
warrant further discussion. 
/ 
1 Paul B. Sears, Where There is Life: An Introduction to Ecology, 
New, revised edition, (New York: Dell Publishing Company, Inc., 1970), 
pp. 24-25. Emphasis added. 
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Recreation as a Public Good 
The rationale for considering outdoor recreation at a park or the 
utilization of natural resources as a public good is primarily due to 
its "jointness in supply." The meaning of this phrase is that providing 
one man with an opportunity to engage in recreational activity in a 
park at the same time provides others with that same opportunity. The 
fact that fences can be built or that actual or potential users can be 
identified in no way subtracts from the fact that the additional costs 
(marginal costs) of supplying the good to additional users is zero; 
and therefore outdoor recreation is a public good not because of the 
demand side of the market but because of the fact that a facility or 
2 natural resource is either provided or not in large indivisible lumps. 
This lumpiness is the major cause of market failure in recreation. It 
renders the collection of charges commensurable to the benefits derived 
impractical if not impossible. For example, collection of charges for 
the scenic product consumed by Sunday afternoon pleasure walk along the 
C&O Canal towpath, might be futile or at best an expensive endeavor. As 
a result, non-fee or non-macket priced usage is commonly associated with 
most forms of outdoor recreation. 3 
2charles J. Cicchetti, Joseph J. Seneca, and Paul Davidson, The 
Demand and Supply of Outdoor Recreation (New Jersey: Rutgers--The-8tate 
University, 1969), pp. 35-36. 
3E. Boyd Wennergren, "Valuing Non-Market Prices Recreational Resources," 
Land Economics, (August, 1964), p. 304. 
53 
The prevalent notion that certain services should be provided without 
charge can also be attributed to the meritorious4 nature of those services. 
Recreation is no different from public education in this 
nature--everyone stands to gain from living in an educated as well as 
healthy community. Perhaps the zero price for the use of outdoor 
recreational facilities is a recognition which society has given to 
the meritorious qualities of outdoor recreation. Its use has been 
encouraged by making it available free of charge. 
Another important aspect of some outdoor recreation is the "learning 
by doing" phenomenon. This means that recreation is not demanded until 
supplied, which may entail a high fixed cost. Thus, it is unlikely to 
expect the private producers to supply them unless induced by a subsidy 
5 
or given a tax advantage. 
The high fixed cost of outdoor recreational facilities is a com-
pelling economic force for the private operators to use the facilities 
in maximum use;
6 
this maximum use of facilities may well mean over use 
or a long-run deterioration of the area, physically or in terms of satis-
faction per unit of use or both, 
To categorize recreation as a public good is to subtract the role 
of the market in its production and utilization. We have seen that 
several factors combine to favor the public ownership of outdoor 
4Richard Musgrave, The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public 
Economy (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1959), p. 13. 
5cicchetti, et al op. cit., p. 37. 
6Marion Clawson and Jack L. Knetsch, Economics of Outdoor Recreation 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), pp. 180-181. 
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recreational resorts. Summarily, these factors are: the indivisible 
nature of the product, recreation as a "merit want," the high fixed cost 
and the deterioration in quality if left to private business. The 
prevalence of zero price for ou.tdoor recreation does not mean, however, 
that recreation is a free good, and that the income constraint has been 
lifted from its consumption. Recreation, like any other good, competes 
for consumer's income. Consequently, some form of economic constraint 
is operative in establishing consumption levels of even non-market priced 
recreational facilities. The task before us is to clarify the form of 
this economic constraint on the consumer's income. Before doing this, 
however, we have to see, what, if anything, intrinsic in the nature of 
recreation as a good, sets it apart from other goods. Or more specifically, 
are the benefits from recreation comparable to benefits from other goods. 
Ar&uments Against the Measurement of 
Benefits from Recreation 
It is a commonplace thought that the enjoyment of recreation is 
an escape from all the mundane aspects of life. As such a refuge, 
into aesthetic values of recreation do not lend themselves to quantifi-
cation and any attempt to measure the benefits from recreation is doomed 
to failure. 7 
7on these grounds "the United States Forest Service has refused 
to place dollar values on recreational use of forests under its juris-
diction. The Forest Service has been able to live with this policy, 
however, only because it need not resort to dollar comparisons to 
justify its programs." Andrew H. Trice and Samuel E. Wood, "Measurement 
of Recreation Benefits," Land Economics (August, 1958), p. 4. 
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But a moment of reflection will make it clear that there are 
aesthetic values embedded in varieties of goods, reading of a good book, 
listening to music, reclining on a rocking chair next to a fireplace, etc. 
Yet, in all these cases we have paid a price, a market determined price, 
for those goods for the sheer purpose of deriving those aesthetic 
values from them. Why should recreation be treated differently? 
Perhaps one would argue that recreation is an intangible good and 
all the goods mentioned so far are tangible. This again should not 
bother us, for there is a striking similarity between, say, the purchase 
of a book and the taking of a trip to a recreation resort. Some income 
will have to be foregoine, in one case equal to the price of a book, 
in another equal to the expenditure that will make the trip possible. 
The area of recreation resort parallels the tangibleness of the book. 
And finally the enjoyment of reading the book matches the derivation 
of the aesthetic value from recreation. 
With all the similarity that can be struck between recreation 
goods and other goods still the evaluation of recreation goods has been 
at the heart of the problem in the economics of recreation. But the 
element that is responsible for complicating the valuation of recreation 
goods is not the associated aesthetic values, rather it is the lack of 
k 
. . 8 
conventional mar et pr1c1ng. 
Most writers have considered recreation as belonging to the realm 
of public goods and have pointed to the problem of the failure of the 
8 Boyd Wennergren, op. cit., p. 304, 
market to determine the value of recreation. 9 In Chapter II, we saw 
how the market failure called for public intervention both on the 
grounds of efficiency and equity. The failure of the market also 
necessitates the use of other techniques for the evaluation of 
benefits from recreation. But the establishment of benefits should 
take precedence over the use of techniques. 
Benefits from Recreation 
There is no hard and fast rule for measuring the benefits 
from recreation. Some have attached benefits to every phase of a 
1 . . 
10 d h h h ld h recreationa act~v~ty, an some ot ers ave e t e view that 
9see Cicchetti et al, op. cot., pp. 36-39; Herbert H. Stoevener 
and William G. Brown-,-" .Analytical Issues in Demand for Recreation," 
JFE (December, 1967), pp. 1296-98; John Krutilla and Jack Knetsch, 
op. cit., p. 66; Leonard Merewitz, "Recreation Benefits of Water R 
Resource Development," Water Resources Research (Fourth Quarter, 
1966), p. 632-35; Jack Knetsch, "Economics of Including Recreation 
as a Purpose of Eastern Water Projects," JFE (December, 1964), 
p. 1153; and David W. Seckler, "On the Us~and Abuses of 
Economic Science in Evaluating Public Outdoor Recreation," Land 
Economics, (November, 1966), pp. 490-94. 
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10Marion Clawson divides these phases into anticipation, travel 
to, on site, travel back, and recollection. See Marion Clawson, Land 
and Water for Recreation, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), 
pp. 39-43. Also Marion Clawson and Jack Knetsch, op. cit., pp. 33-35. 
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since benefits from recreation are in direct and indirect forms, they 
always outweigh the costs that incur as in the development of a 
. 1 f .1. 11 recreatLona acL Lty. 
For purposes of recognition, one may classify the benefits 
h 
. 12 from recreation into t ree categorLes: 
a. The direct benefit of recreation is the enjoyment, 
b. 
physical or mental, which a person derives from his 
leisure time activity undertaken in a relatively non-
urban environment characterized by nature setting. 
13 Much in the same view as expressed by Paul Sears, an 
investigation by the National Institute of Mental Health 
showed that outdoor recreational experiences confer a 
unique and long-lasting psychic benefit on the partici-
pants because of taking place in a natural environment. 
11This has been the case with evaluations carried out by the 
Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau staff customarily estimates costs 
of recreational developments and then assigns an equal amount to 
primary recreational benefits. Then each of the benefits, primary 
and secondary, is in turn considered to be equal to the costs of 
development. In this way benefits are twice the costs for all pro-





2 for i 1, 2, .•. n number of projects. See Trice and 
Wood, op. cit., pp. 205-206. 
12A great many of these points are brought up by Ruth P. Mack 
and Sumner Myers, "Outdoor Recreation," in Measuring Benefits of Govern-
ment SEending, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1966), 
pp. 74-75. 
13 op. cit. , p. 25. 
c. The intangible benefits of recreation accrue to a nation as 
a whole. These benefits are of three sorts: (1) the third 
party benefits which result from the advantage to all 
people, whether or not users of outdoor recreation, of 
living in a country where more than fewer people are 
educated in the ways of the out-of-doors. Here again, 
the benefits rest on the assumption that the enjoyment 
of outdoor recreation is meritorious, just as the 
enjoyment of good books, art, music, or any sort of 
extension of one's capacity to appreciate the fullness 
of life. (2) There is the conservation aspects of 
an outdoor recreation resource which can also include 
the preservation of historic, scientific, scenic, and 
aesthetic values. (3) The lack of recreational 
activities is said to have caused an increase in de-
linquency, and other crimes. 
Almost all the intangible benefits are affecting parties other 
than the ones experiencing outdoor recreation. As such, the 
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intangible benefits are externalities in consumption that stem from 
outdoor recreation. 
In conclusion it must be stated that while the direct and 
indirect benefits accrue to the consumer, the externalities are 
benefits that incur largely to parties other than the consumer. 
Appreciation in land value has been noted as another benefit 
from recreation. With regard to the rise in land value, Clawson 
writes: 
Full evaluation of the economic worth or value 
of the product of recreation areas needs to take 
account of not only the user's benefits of visitors, 
also the possible increment in land values resulting 
from the influence of such areas. • • • The total 
direct economic value of public recreation areas 
is the sum of the two sets of values: (1) the 
user benefit or the value's which people receive 
from visits that involve travel to the area, and 
(2) the.values cr~italized in land near the 
recreat~on area. 
15 16 . 17 
Jack Knetsch ' and Schut]er and Hallberg have expressed 
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similar views about the inclusion of the rise in value of land, due to 
14Marion Clawson and Jack Knetsch, op. cit., p. 222. 
15Jack L. Knetsch, "The Influence of Reservior Projects on Land 
Values," JFE (February, 1964), pp. 240-241. 
16 , Economics of Including Recreation as a Purpose ----------------of Eastern Water Projects," JFE (December, 1964), p. 1151 
17w.A. Schutjer and M.C. Hallberg, "Impact of Recreational Develop-
ment on Rural Property Values," AJAE, (August, 1966), p. 573. 
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its close proximity to a recreation resort as an additional benefit from 
recreation. 
~1ile one may find merits in knowing the extent to which the value 
of land rises due to the development of recreational resorts, the 
inclusion of such increments as part of recreational benefits is hardly 
justified. 
18 19 As has been noted by Musgrave, Prest and Turvey the 
external effects of a public investment that are of a pecuniary nature 
and present themselves via prices of products or factors should not be 
added (subtracted) as benefits (costs) of a project. For one thing any 
net difference in prices or the increments in rents and land values is 
simply a reflection of the benefits of more activities being undertaken, 
etc.; and it would be double counting if they were included too. 
Another reason disfavoring the inclusion of such increments in benefits 
is that they do not accrue to the recreationist, and as such are of a 
transfer nature and find their place in the pockets of those who own 
the land. If anything,the appreciation in land value may work as an 
inducement for land developers who, in the words of Paul Sears, II• ln 
their eagerness to get most out of every square foot of land, 
often bulldoze out every tree that might soften the starkness of 
mass housing and level off any irregularities of surface that might 
add a bit of interest and relie£."
20
--hardly a benefit to recreationists. 
18 
op. cit., p. 799. 
19 op. cit., p. 160. 
20
Paul Sears, op. cit., p. 25. 
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Measuring the Benefits from Recreation 
So far we have discussed the benefits from recreation in a somewhat 
objective manner, i.e., we have tried to assess those benefits in terms 
of fulfilling the biological and psychological needs of man. How a 
recreationist, a recipient of those benefits, views them is a question 
that has not been answered. 
A consumer is not in the habit of categorizing the merits of a 
good. In order to establish a trade-off between a good and his income, 
the consumer has to lump the benefits that he can attribute to the good. 
In case of recreation, since its consumption is time intensive, this 
trade-off has to be established not only with income but also with 
time.
21 
To appraise the benefits of recreation from the point of view 
of the consumer is tantamount to measuring his willingness to pay for 
them in terms of his income and time. Such a willingness to pay, 
needless to add, is a reflection of total payment for all the benefits 
that recreation inures to the consumer--the total of direct and indirect 
benefits. 
In Chapter III, we saw that consumer's surplus was a viable tool 
for the measurement of willingness to pay for the usefullness of a good. 
In assessing the willingness to pay for recreation we want to use the 
notion of consumers surplus, with one important proviso, however. 
21The notion that the consumption of recreation is constrained 
both by income and time has important bearing on the demand curve for 
recreation, a point which will be considered when we discuss the demand 
for recreation. 
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Consumer's surplus is a measure of value in use vis-a-vis value 
in exchange. It is important to distinguish between the two measures 
in private or marketable goods. But in public goods, as in the case of 
recreation, the lack of a market determined price, renders the notion 
of value in exchange meaningless. 
As can be seen in Figure 5,, the market price of P has divided the 
0 
area under the demand curve (up to quantity consumed, Q ) into value 
0 
in use (consumers surplus) which is the triangular shaded area, and the 
value in exchange which is the rectangular shaded area. For public 
goods, such a division of the total area under the demand curve cannot 






The above implication of the non-existence of market price has 
not been carried through in some of the otherwise brilliant work in 
h f bl . d Th c· h · 1 22 · h · t e area o pu 1c goo s. us, 1cc ett1 et ~·· 1n t e1r assess-
ment of mass demonstrations have divided the area under the demand 
curve for participation into two, similar to the one demonstrated in 
Figure 5, and have called one the value in use and the other the value 
23 
in exchange. 
An entrance fee may be suggested as a price that divides the 
area under the demand curve between the consumer's surplus and the 
value in exchange. The objections to this suggestion are two. (1) A 
zero price is associated with a majority of public recreational resorts 
in the United States, and (2) What is more important, if a fee is set, 
it is set arbitrarily and as such cannot measure the value in exchange 
in the sense that a market determined price does. 
The nature of emendation that suggests itself for the use of 
consumer's surplus in assessing the willingness to pay for recreation 
should be obvious now. We are dealing with total benefits from recreation 
and need to measure how much in total the consumer is willing to pay for 
it. Consumer's surplus is only a measure of partial willingness to 
22 op. cit., p. 720. 
23similar objections can be raised about the work done by David 
Seckler, op. cit. In large part these applications result from efforts 
to simulate the market for private goods in the case of public goods. 
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24 
pay. The total area under the demand curve for recreation measures 
the \villingness to pay in toto, of course, for the benefits that accrue 
to the recreationist himself. The external benefits occurring to third 
parties are not quantified by the total area under the demand curve. 
All efforts to measure these external benefits, which are mostly 
associated with public goods, have foundered on the rocks. 25 As a 
last resort the suggestion is offered that these intangibles be extended 
recognition by applying a lower rate of discount in the case of goods 
that impart these externalities. 
Demand Curve for Recreation 
It is important to bear in mind that demand, in the usual sense, 
the rellltion between quantities and the market price of a commodity, 
does not apply to recreation. The basic flaw in the definition when 
applied to recreation is brought about by the lack of a market which 
has caused the absence of a price. Without this conventional measure 
of economic value, we are left with the problem of developing surrogate 
variables which would simulate the market in determining the value of 
recreation. It is perhaps illuminating to see how these surrogate 
variables were developed by different economists and the changes they 
have seen through time. 
24see the definition of consumer's surplus in Chapter III. 
25Prest and Turvey, op. cit., p. 168. 
65 
Professor Hotelling was the first to suggest the use of travel 
cost as a measure of willingness to pay for recreation. While this 
suggestion was made in 1949, an elaboration of H~telling'' s views was 
carried out by Andrew H. Trice and Samuel E. Wood in the August, 1958 
issue of Land Economics. In a paper presented at a meeting of the 
Taylor-Hibbard Club on January 13, 1959, at the University of Wisconsin, 
26 
Marion Clawson applied Hotellings idea to four national parks. Ever 
since numerous other writers have used similar methods in deriving 
demand curves for different recreational facilities. 
As Cicchetti and others rightly point out, the travel cost method 
of estimation is a special case of a general gravity model of social 
interaction. The model has been used to estimate the demand function 
for transportation, communication, tourism and perhaps mostly for 
recreation. "In these models the independent variable V .. is the number 
lJ 
of visits, trips, or messages from source i to destination j. The 
variable V .. is held to be a function of some gravity variables 
lJ 
representing the attraction potential, e.g. population N fori and j; 
other socioeconomic variables S for i and j and distance D, taken to 
be a surrogate of the cost of overcoming the separation between source 
26rhere is hardly a paper on outdoor recreation or related fields 
that does not cite Clawson's Methods of Measuring the Demand for and 
the Value of Outdoor Recreation (Washington: Resources for the Future 
Reprint 10), 1959. Clawson has been the most prolific writer in the 
field. See the Bibliography. 
and destination. A general statement of such a model is: 
a b c d e 
(4) v .. 
lJ 




27 where A is a constant and U .. is a random error term. 11 
lJ 
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Of course, each area of use will necessitate some revision in the 
model. For recreation the majority of studies have found travel costs, 
population and income as the explanatory variable for visits to recreation 
spots. Let us now turn to a discussion of each of these variables. 
Travel Cost 
Recreation is time intensive in its consumption. This unique 
feature of recreation subjects the consumption of recreation to a time 
constraint in addition to the usual constraintwhich is income. Thus, 
in overcoming distance, one incurs two expenditures, one in time and 
one in terms of the usual travel expenses. However, the two expenditures 
are highly correlated, which makes it difficult to separate their effects 
statistically. The argument is in favor of measuring the two expenditures 
jointly. But before they can be added, it is necessary that expenditure 
in terms of time be translated into monetary terms. The question is 
what is the accounting price for a unit of travel time? In addition, 
the distance travelled calls for accounting prices for mileage as a 
unit of distance. 
27 op. cit., Cicchetti et al, p. 719-720. 
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A · · 
28 f d" 1 d A h" . ccountlng prlce or lstance trave e .-- ttac lng a prlce per 
mile traveled is a subjective matter and depends on the judgement of 
the analyst. Table 1 (column 2) is a list of the mileage cost used for 
different studies. 
Table 1. Accounting Prices for Distance and Time 
(1) 
Author(s) 
Cicchetti, Freeman III, 
Haveman and Knetsch 
Clawson 
Trice and Wood 
Jack Knetsch 





5.5¢ per person per mile 





$2.19 per 35 miles per hour 
6¢ 










In deriving the demand curve for recreation in Fort Frederick, in 
the next chapter, a travel cost of 5¢ per mile will be used. Although 
this is a minimum figure as compared with those in column 2 of Table 1, 
our intention in using it is to arrive at a lower estimate of benefits 
to recreationists. 
28 Some authors apply the name shadow pricing to stipulation that 
are called for in the absence of market determined prices or in spite of 
them. We prefer to leave the name shadow prices to dual variables that 
are arrived at by the use of simplex method in linear programming. 
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Accounting price for time spent.--Finding an accounting price for 
the time spent in recreation, or any non-income generating activity, 
is plagued by many problems. At the heart of the problem is the fact 
29 that the economics of time is largely unexplored. Economists cannot 
be blamed for this; exploration by other disciplines has not fared too 
well in the pursuit of this endeavor either. 
A look at Table 1 shows that although the accounting prices for 
distance and time are both conjured up by the analysts, the latter 
has resulted in a greater degree of conjecturism. As can be seen in 
Column 3 of the Table, some authors have dispensed with the use of an 
accounting price for time (or have used a zero price for it) and among 
the rest the difference is rather significant. Different reasoning may 
lead one to attach either a very high price to leisure time or neglect 
it completely. 
One can argue, on the side of a high price, that leisure time is 
not for sale. People need leisure to charge their batteries, so to 
speak, in order to be productive in their.working time. If one tries 
to bribe them off their leisure, they must come up with lucrative pro-
positions. 
On the other side of the spectrum, one can argue in the face of 
unemployment, present almost everywhere, that the opportunity cost of 
leisure time is zero. However, it can be said that it might be true 
that for some,leisure can be evaluated at zero price, there are still 
others who will get paid, very highly at times, to sacrifice their leisure. 
29
Gary S. Becker, "A Theory of the Allocation of Time," The 
Economic Journal, (September, 1965), pp. 493-517. 
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Another argument in favor of a positive price for leisure 
results from the fact that invariably all individuals can perform income 
saving activities, or activities that raise their productivity. Acti-
vities such as repairing one's car, television, etc., or furthering 
one's knowledge through reading a book, talking to an expert, watching 
television. In a nutshell, no phase of human experience is without a 
value. 
In this study, tninimum wage is applied as an accounting price 
for time spent in recreation, travelling or otherwise. Only sleeping 
time is evaluated at a zero price. 
Income 
The ability to choose one's residence is determined mainly by 
income. To the extent that one lives in a scenic surrounding, one may 
not find it necessary to frequent a recreational resort for its scenic 
beauty. But at the same time outdoor recreation is a package of several 
activities like picnicing, fishing, sightseeing, canoeing, pleasure 
walking, camping, etc., all of which require ample open space in addition 
to scenic beauty. 
The urban, rural, suburban and slum division is a locational 
approximation of income distribution. So, income determines location, 
which was the first variable suggested by many for measuring one's 
willingness to pay for an outdoor recreational activity. 
In addition, it is rightly argued that the much vaunted rationing 
function of the price system is as much or more a matter of the structure 
70 
of income distribution as of the marginal utility of commodities. 30 
To put it differently, were income distribution more uniform, .demand 
curves for most goods would be flatter as shown in Figure 6. The 
three demand curves while all belonging to a hypothetical commodity 
reflect three different levels of income distribution, the flattest 
belonging to the most uniform level of distribution. Thus, the slope 
and position of a statistical demand curve for recreation or any other 
good is largely a function of income distribution. As such, benefits 
calculated as the area under a demand curve for recreation is also 
biased with regard to income distribution. Since willingness to pay 
is synonymous \vith willingness to give up income, at a high cost to 
the user, the users of a given recreational facility are wealthier than 
the users of the same facility at a lower cost. Thus, a recreational 
resort built in a poor community may not meet the efficiency criteria 
(benefits should exceed cost) and the one built in a wealthy community 
may meet the criteria solely on the basis of income difference and not 
the desire for recreation. If the demand curve of the former could be 
shifted up or of the latter could be shifted down to allow for the 
difference in income distribution, then both resorts may pass the test 
in the same way. 
30David W. Sickler, "On the Uses and Abuses of Economic Science 
in Evaluating Public Outdoor Recreation, 11 Land Economics (November, 





At any rate, it is important to include the income variable in 
deriving a demand curve for recreation. In the study of recreational 
demand for Fort Frederick, the per capita income of the county from 
which the visits originated is included 'in the analysis. 
Population 
The significance of population as a variable which significantly 
affects the demand for recreation can hardly be questioned. It is 
population that causes congestion and hence induces the people of the 
area to seek recreation out-of-doors. On the other hand, a sparsely 
populated community such as found in rural communities, may not find 
it necessary to frequent recreational resorts often. Partly because 
of their surroundings and partly because of the nature of work, mostly 
farming, that occupies them. 
The inclusion of population variable in a demand function also 
shifts the demand curve to the right. But here no adjustment is 
necessary since a rightward shift in the demand curve due to a higher 
population is justified. 
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The population of the counties which were the origin of 
visitors to Fort Frederick are included in the analysis of recreation 
of the area. 
Summary and Implications 
The nature of the demand curve for recreation that suggests itself 
is: 
(5) V. . = f (E, P. , Y.) 
lJ l l 
Equation (5) is a demand function for recreation in the implicit form 
where visits (V .. ) from origin i to a recreational resort j is a 
lJ 
function of travel expenditures (E), population of the area (P.) and 
l 
income of the area (Y.). One expects a negative sign to be associated 
l 
withE and positive signs with P. andY .• 
l l 
The integration of the area under the demand curve thus derived 
should give us a measure of an area's worth as a recreational resort. 
It is important to bear in mind, that the area under such a 
demand curve is a proxy measure for two categories of direct and indirect 
benefits only. The third party benefits, also called the intangible 
benefits, are not measured by the area under this demand curve. They 
are left out of our calculations, and to that extent the calculations 
are an understatement of the recreational benefits. 
CHAPTER V 
THE RECREATION BENEFITS FROM 
FORT FREDERICK STATE PARK: 
AN APPLICATION 
Introduction 
Although most state parks owe their existence to the Great 
Depression when federal funds were used by states to embark upon 
major park and recreation projects,
1 
their greater use is in large 
measure due to the prosperity and higher productivity that the 
American economy has experienced after World War II. It is also 
noteworth that the paid vacation is a post-World War II phenomenon. 
The rise in expenditure on recreation has also been rapid in recent 
years, amounting to approximately $11 billion in 1960. 2 
In Maryland, over 9,000,000 visitors attended the 45 authorized 
state parks in 1970; a 200 percent increase from 1966. 3 This rapid 
increase in attendance in state parks is the reason behind state 
1
As a result of such activities, by 1940, almost all states had 
some form of state park system. See Marion Clawson, Land and Water 
For Recreation, (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1963), p. 23. 
2Ibid., p. 109 
3Department of Forests and Parks, Maryland State Parks: Action 
Program for Development, (Revised July, 1971), p. 2. 
7? 
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authorities' decision to develop all of the 47,000 plus acres of land 
in state parks, of which only 2,000 acres is already developed. 
Fort Frederick State Park is one of the 45 state parks in 
Maryland. The restoration of the Fort took place in 1931, and ever 
since is used as a recreation resort. It is located in Washington 
County on a rather narrow strip of land that borders Virginia, West 
Virginia and Pennsylvania. As such it is a tourist attraction for 
visitors who appreciate the historical significance
4 
and enjoy 
recreational activities in the area. 
In addition, Fort Frederick is located on the C&O Canal to which 
the U.S. Government has also turned its attention in terms of developing 
the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal National Historical Park. 
4rhe Fort was built in 1756 in an effort to protect the settlers 
against the French and the Indians. 
Mr. Coulter, Deputy Secretary, Maryland Department of 
Natural Resources has described Fort Frederick as follows: 
"It is one of the original forts. A program which is 
heavily supported by the local population is included in the park 
program. That is, they actually reenact, during times of the year, 
some of the scenes and some of the things that happened at that park. 
A plan for the park has been laid out. This is rather high in the 
priority of the state for acquisition. A total of 3,420 acres are 
within the take line. About 2,900 of these acres are scheduled to 
be acquired. In other words, about 500 acres, the fort itself, has 
been acquired, and we are acquiring other land." Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Parks and Recreation, United States Senate 9lst. 
Congress, Second Session on S. 1859 and H.R. 19342 (December 15, 1970), 
p. 66. 
It is not yet determined whether the development of Fort 
Frederick will be a joint effort, or whether it will be carried out 
by the United States or the State of Maryland alone. But the 
increased attention is all the more reason for an economic analysis 
of the worth of the fort to the visitors concerned. The fort, in 
addition to its historic significance, attracts visitors for 
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picnicing, fishing, camping, and other outdoor recreational activities. 
The method of analysis developed so far will be applied to Fort 
Frederick. A paradigmatic presentation, contained in the following 
section, will clarify the methodology that has been followed. 
A Methodological Overview 
A paradigmatic presentation of the applied part can be done 
through the use of the three dimensional diagram in Figure 7. The 
time span of the figure is denoted by several dates. The origin of 
the figure is marked 1756 the date in which Fort Frederick was built, 
1931 is the year in which it was restored and used as a recreation 
resort. Nineteen forty-seven to 1971 mark the period over which the 
attendance record for the use of Fort Frederick is available; 1972 to 
2000 is the period for which a projection of the trend of attendance 
has been made. 
The triangles in the figure show the demand curves for recreation 
for the dates indicated. The base of the triangles measure the yearly 
visits to Fort Frederick by recreationists, the altitude of the 
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triangles measure the expenditures in time and otherwise incurred by 
the recreationists. The objective is to measure the areas under the 
demand curves for years 1972-2000--the equivalent of measuring the 
volume of the prism-like figure ABCDEF. As can be seen in the figure, 
measuring the volume of the prism requires calculation into the future 
which is unknown. But we do know something about the past and the 
present. What we do know, with certain degree of accuracy is the area 
of the triangle AEF for 1972. Through a sample survey of visitors, 
it was possible to translate the projected attendance figure for 1972 
into a recreation demand curve. Thus, given the area of the triange 
and a rather strong assumption that the past attendance and expenditure 
patterns will continue into the future, the task of measuring the 
volume of the prism is set. TI1e volume of the prism, lest one forgets, 
is an approximation of the stream of benefits of Fort Frederick to the 
consumers. 
The stream of benefit, thus obtained, will have to be collapsed 
into one figure, to be used in the calculation of benefit-cost ratio. 
That is when the figures are discounted and their present value is 
found for 1972.
5 
5see Chapter III on the rationale for discounting. 
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A Projection of Attendance 
On the basis of data available
6 
from 1947 to 1971, a projection 
of attendance was made. Several regressions were run. Equation (6) 
was chosen on the basis of its high coefficient of correlation and the 
highly significant coefficients for the independent variables. In the 
equation, A indicates attendance and t stands for time. The figures 
below the coefficients are their standard errors. 
(6) A= .24- 3413.45t + 1.76t2 
(299.27) (.153) 
Column 2 in Table 2 contains the actual data up to 1971, and 
column 4 is the projected attendance figures for the years 1972-2000, 
based upon equation (6). 
By applying the formula for geometric mean the rate of increase 
7 in the attendance is found to be 6 percent per year. In terms of 
Figure 7, the 6 percent annual rate of growth means that the abscissa 
of each year's triangle is 6 percent larger than that of the preceding year. 
The anticipated rise in attendance, due to the bicentenial celebra-
tion, is not reflected in the projected figures in column 4. It is likely 
that a greater number of people will visit the Fort than the figure for 
6The data were obtained through the courtesy of the Department of 
Forests and Parks. 
7 
The growth rate 
n-1 
;r-A-n~/~A-1 where A1 stands for attendance in 
year one (1947) calculated to be 26712, A is attendance in year 1971 
n 1/24 1/24 
calculated to be 110297. So, (110297/26712) = (4.12912) which is 
1.060. 
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Table 2. Actual and Projected Visits to Fort Frederick 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Years Actual Attendance Years Projected Attendance 
1947 21,988 1972 113 '824 
1948 26,281 1973 117,354 
1949 32,911 1974 120,888 
1950 32,591 1975 124,425 
1951 33,187 1976 127,965 
1952 36,593 1977 131,510 
1953 35,240 1978 135,05 7 
1954 42,055 1979 138,609 
1955 44,202 1980 142 '164 
1956 71,264 1981 145' 722 
1957 47,236 1982 149,284 
1958 45,819 1983 152,849 
1959 39 '9 72 1984 156,418 
1960 40,6 77 1985 159,991 
1961 68,943 1986 163,567 
1962 77' 953 1987 167,146 
1963 71' 134 1988 170,729 
1964 90,020 1989 174,316 
1965 N. A. 1990 177,906. 
1966 N.A. 1991 181,499 
1967 N .A. 1992 185,096 
1968 N. A. 1993 188,697 
1969 102,793 1994 192,301 
1970 95,345 1995 195,909 
1971 110,520 ' 1996 199,520 
1997 203,135 
1998 206 '753 
1999 210,374 
2000 214,000 
1976 indicates. The attendance may also be higher for the years thereafter, 
because of the publicity that the Fort may receive. 
To establish the relationship of visits to expenditures, a sample 
survey was conducted. The next section is a discussion of the survey 
which was the basis for deriving a demand curve. 
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The Nature of the Sample Survey 
The method of deriving a demand curve for recreation, developed 
in Chapter IV, requires information on the origin of visits and the 
expenditures in terms of time and distance travelled. However, the 
information available on Fort Frederick, or any of the 45 state parks 
in Maryland, is limited to the total annual visits to the parks over 
a range of 10 to 20 years. Hence, it was necessary to know the 
distance which the visitors travelled, and the time they spent to get 
to their desired spot. In addition to the distance, one needs to 
know the origin of visitors in order to determine the population and 
the income of those areas. 
In order to obtain information on the distance travelled, time 
spent, and the places of origin of the visitors to Fort Frederick, a 
sample survey was conducted over a two-day period (a Saturday and a week 
day). The size of the sample surveyed was close to 420 people. The 
visitors in the sample carne from 17 counties in five different states--
Maryland, West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and the 
District of Columbia. Thus, altogether there were 18 sources from 
which the visits originated. 
Although sampling over a longer period of time would have captured 
other sources of origin, the 18 sources of origins, obtained thus far, 
were enough for our purposes. Sampling the visitors over a longer 
period, most likely during their summer vacatio~would pose the 
problem of dividing the distance travelled over the number of recreation 
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spots that the vacationers would likely visit. Time spent on travel 
would also have to be divided among the many spots that were visited. 
In the month of June, the time that the present survey was conducted, 
the multiplicity of recreation spots attended by visitors did not arise, 
or it can be safely assumed to have been minimum. This is not to 
claim, however, that the sample is the best that could be conducted. 
The intention here is illustration first and accuracy second. 
That the observed pattern of visits in the sample is exemplary 
of the annual visits to Fort Frederick, is an assumption implicit in 
this research. However, the nature of the assumption is common to 
all the studies that generalize from the observed to the unknown. 
Derivation of a Demand Curve for Recreation 
in Fort Frederick 
In the previous chapter the following equation was used as an 
implicit demand function for recreation. 
(5) V .. = F(E, P., Y.) 
l.J 1. 1. 
When applied to Fort Frederick, V stands for the 17 counties and 
the District of Columbia (i.e., i = 1, 2, •••• 18) from which visits to 
Fort Frederick (j) originated. The independent variables E, P. andY. 
1. 1. 
are expenditures, population,and income, in that orde~which are 
elaborated upon below. 
Expenditures 
The expenditure on recreation was calculated on the following 
basis. 
(7) E 2M($.05) (.25) + 2TT ($1.60) + ST ($1.60). 
Where M is miles travelled (from i to j), TT is travel time and ST 
is stay time. 
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As indicated by the first term in equation (7) the two way travel 
distance was evaluated at 5 cents per mile. Since the average number 
of people per car was found to be 4, the total cost of round trip 
was divided by 4 to arrive at travel cost per person. 
The second term in the equation is the round trip travel time, 
evaluated at $1.60 or minimum wage per hour. The stay time, 
excluding the sleeping time, was also evaluated at $1.60 per hour. 
Population 
The population data consists of the number of poeple in the 
counties from which the visits originated. The inclusion of 
population in the demand equation is to reflect the differences in 
visits that will be caused by the size of pop~lation alone. For 
example, from two areas that are equal in distance from Fort Frederick, 
the difference in the number of visits may be caused by the difference 




Two communities with equal distance and equal population may also 
differ in their visits to Fort Frederick by their income. Income can 
also be hypothesized to have positive relation to visits. 
Expenditures were gathered through the use of the sample survey 
described in the previous section. The income and population data used 
were obtained from General Population Characteristics: 1970 Census of 
Population.
8 
Table 3 is a summary of the data used in the derivation of a 
demand curve for Fort Frederick. The column headings are symbols 
used for variables in the demand equation. 
Several forms of demand equations were attempted. The selection 
of the equation used for the analysis of benefits to the consumers 
rests upon: (1) the level of significance of the coefficients of the 
variables in the equation, and (2) the contribution that the number of 
variables, on the one hand, and the different specification of the 




Equation (8) chosen on the basis of the above criteria, was used 
as the demand function for recreation in Fort Frederick. 
8 U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Census, General Population 
Characteristics: 1970 Census of Population, (October, 1971). 
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Table 3. Data Used in Derivation of the Demand Curve 
v E p y 
Count~ and State Visits Expenditures Population Income 
Washington, Md. 23,819 14.70 103' 824 2,838 
Frederick, Md. 1,873 11.88 84,927 2,900 
Prince Georges, Md. 1,338 21.14 660,567 3,742 
Allegany, Md. 3,746 10.77 84,044 2,584 
Howard, Md. 1,606 12.45 61,911 3,836 
Anne Arundel, Md. 4,014 14.16 297,539 3,362 
Baltimore, Md. 7,226 23.88 621,077 3,965 
Montgomery, Md. 23,548 20.86 522,809 5,188 
Morgan, W. Va. 2,141 4.62 8,557 2,132 
Clarke, W. Va. 535 9.75 8,102 3,080 
Fairfax, Va. 6,958 20.27 455,021 5,452 
Stafford, Va. 535 15.40 24,587 2,631 
York, Pa. 1,338 17.40 272,603 3,209 
Wayne, Pa. 535 13.20 29,581 2,360 
Franklin, Pa. 268 14.70 100,833 2,619 
Lebanon, Pa. 6,155 48.82 99,665 2,990 
Morris, N.J. 2,676 53.50 387,454 4,134 
District of Columbia 24,621 33.40 756,492 4,273 
Source: Visits and Expenditures were obtained through a sample 
survey conducted in Fort Frederick. Population and income 
were taken fromthe General Population Characteristics: 1970 
Census of Population. 
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(8) ln V -1.41 ln (E + .8) + 2.10 ln Y + .53 ln P - 11.62 





In the equation all the variables are in natural logs. All the 
coefficients are significant at above 90 percent. As was expected, 
the visits are inversely related to expenditures and directly related 
to population and income. The Durban-Watson statistics (2.062) 
indicates zero auto correlation and the existence of homoscedasticity, 
implying that the coefficients obtained forE, Y, and P are reasonably 
good measures of the relation of those variables to V. 
Now that equation (8) is found to be a good approximation of 
how visits to Fort Frederick are affected by the travel expenses, 
population and income in the places of origin, let us turn to a 
quantification of the relationship to find total willingness to pay by 
the consumers. 
Integration of the Area Under the Demand Curve 
as a Measure of Total Willingness to Pay 
The theoretical grounds for integrating the area under the demand 
curve as a measure of willingness to pay was already discussed in 
Chapters III and IV. The following form of equation (8) matches the 
original form suggested in equation (4) in Chapter IV. 
(9) v = 
(E + •8)1.41 ell.62 
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All the terms are familiar in equation (9) except for e which is the 
number 2. 7818. 
The addition of .8 to expenditure variable in equation (8) needs 
some explanation. The original form of equation (8) without the .8 
added was found to be: 
(10) ln V 1.35 E + 2.10 Y + .54 ln P - 11.96 
(.52) (1.04) (.22) 
where the values in parentheses are the standard errors as before and 
2 the R was .65. In this form of the equation, as with any equation 
estimated in the logs, the demand curve is asymptotic to both axes. 
As such, the area under the curve is infinity--can one imagine the 
willingness to pay for recreation at Fort Frederick, signified by the 
area, to be even greater than the GNP of the country! 
As shown in Figure 8, the addition of a number toE, (.8 in 
this case) has shifted the V-axis intercepting the demand curve at 
point B. This technique defines the area under the demand curve. But, 
it leaves the area of the rectangle OV
0
BC out of calculation, the 
omission calls for an adjustment in terms of adding the area of the 
rectangle to the rest of the area under the curve. 
The demand curve being asymptotic to the E-axis poses no problem, 








The value obtained from the integration of equation (8) amounting 
to $1,103,689 is the area under the demand curve for 1972. Dividing 
the figure by the number of visits in 1972 gives $9.69 as the per 
capita expenditure in terms of miles travelled, and time spent on a 
recreation trip to the Fort. Given the fact that time is not valued 
in some of the other studies, the figure compares favorably with 
9 
$l3.00 per visit given by Clawson. 
Given certain assumptions about the rate of annual change in the 
independent variables in equation (8), the areas under the demand 
curves for the entire period 1970-2000 can be estimated. Hence, 
10 
population was assumed to grow at 1.4 percent. Income was computed 
11 
to grow at 2 percent. The rate of growth for expenditure on 
12 recreation was found to be 7 percent. 
9 Land and Water for Recreation, op. cit., p. 109 
10 Maryland State Parks Action Program for Development, op. cit., 
p. 6. 
11 12 . 
' See Append1x I. 
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The Benefit-Cost Ratio for Fort Frederick 
The value of the area under demand curves, which is a measure of 
total willingness to pay for visits to Fort Frederick, is shown for 
years 1970-2000 in column (1) of Table 4. Putting it differently, 
the column is the area of the triangles shown in the three dimensional 
diagram in Figure 7. Since willingness to pay is a proxy for the 
benefits derived from recreation at Fort Frederick, column (1) is 
also a stream of benefits from recreational experience at Fort 
Frederick. 
A column of costs is required before a benefit-cost ratio can be 
calculated. The cost figures are partly arrived at through assumption 
and part were obtained from the Maryland State Parks Action Program for 
Development. The figures should serve as an illustration in an effort 
to arrive at a benefit-cost ratio, expected of any such studies. Thus, 
a budget of $100,000 is assumed for the maintenance and salary of the 
personnel at Fort Frederick, column (3), Table 4. Added to this cost 
is the cost of developments in column (4) of Table 4. 
The stream of benefits and cost will have to be added in order to 
calculate a benefit cost ratio. But since the benefits and the costs 
are spread and do not occur at one point in time their simple addition 
poses a problem. Values over time are not commensurable and therefore 
cannot be added. A dollar today is valued more than a dollar a year 
from today. Hence, discounting is used for correcting the influence 
of time on the streams of benefits and costs. 
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Table 4. Estimation of Willingness to Pay and the Costs Incurred in 
the Development of Fort Frederick 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Estimated Present Value Assumed Present Value 
Willingness of Willingness Annual Project of Total Cost 
Years to Pay to Pay Cost Cost (3+4)Discounted 
1970 953 '399 100,000 
1971 1,025,795 100,000 
1972 1,103,689 1,003,253 100,000 90,900 
1973 1,187,497 981,347 100,000 974,592 888,043 
1974 1, 277,6 70 959,913 100,000 80 '951 135,948 
1975 1,374,690 938,913 100,000 68,300 
1976 1,479,077 918,358 100,000 2,551,527 164,338 
1977 1,591,391 898,181 100,000 1,334,373 809,560 
1978 1,712,234 878,547 100,000 51,310 
1979 1,842,252 859 '410 100,000 46,650 
1980 1, 982 '144 840,429 100,000 42,400 
1981 2,132,658 822' 139 100,000 38,550 
1982 2,294,601 804,028 100,000 35,040 
1983 2,468,842 786,573 100,000 31,860 
1984 2,656,314 769,002 100,000 28,960 
1985 2 '858,021 752,516 100,000 26,330 
1986 3,075,045 735,858 100,000 23,930 
1987 3,308,549 719,940 100,000 21,760 
1988 3,559,784 704,125 100,000 19,780 
1989 3,830,096 688,651 100,000 17 '980 
1990 4,120,934 673,772 100,000 16,350 
1991 4,433,858 658,871 100,000 14,860 
1992 4 '770 ,543 644,500 100,000 13,510 
1993 5,132,795 630,307 100,000 12,280 
1994 5,522,554 616,317 100,000 11,160 
1995 5,941,909 603,103 100,000 10,150 
1996 6,393,108 589,444 100,000 9,220 
199 7 6,878,569 577,111 100,000 8,390 
1998 7,400,894 563,948 100,000 7,620 
1999 7,962,881 551,827 100,000 6,930 
2000 8,567,542 539 '755 100,000 6,300 
Total 21,710,036 2,658,409 
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Since 10 percent rate of discount is the maximum that has been 
used in cost-benefit analysis studies, it was chosen as the basis for 
calculation in this study. Column (2) and (5) in Table 4 are the 
present values of the benefits and costs associated with Fort Frederick. 
The sum of column (2), $21,710,036, is the present value of the benefits 
from Fort Frederick from 1972-2000. A similar value for the cost is 
$2,658,409, as shown in Table 4. The division of the former figure 
by the latter gives a very favorable benefit-cost ratio of 8.16, which 
means that the benefits are about eight times greater than the costs, 
remembering that costs used were arrived at by assumption. 
Concluding Remarks and Implications 
Let us see how the methods developed in Chapters II, III, and IV 
have affected the application carried out in this Chapter. 
Market Failure 
At the beginning it was established that public outdoor recreation 
being a public good is a case of market failure, and as such no market 
determined price was to be found for it. As a corollary of absence of 
price, in the economic analysis of recreation, it was found that the 
technique of consumer's surplus had to replace the methods of 
marginalism. Furthermore, consumer's surplus, because of its association 
with a price, was not entirely suited for the analysis intended here. 
It was made obvious that since a recreation spot attracted visitors from 
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the nearest to the farthest distance, the entire area under the demand 
curve was of interest rather than that which existed beyond a certain 
line drawn parallel to the quantity axis. 
Another point with regard to the market failure was that there 
was no need for a market to be resurrected. 13 A good many authors, . after 
deriving a demand curve for recreation, in methods similar to the one 
here, have made an attempt to simulate the market, by varying 11 prices 11 
d d h b f . . Th. . . d 
14 . to e uce t e num er o v1s1ts. 1s, as 1s po1nte out, 1s a 
statistically dubious technique, and of no consequence for the 
analysis. 
Criteria in Cost Benefit Analysis 
Since no flows of receipts are present to be reinvested in a re-
creational project the use of internal rate of return is not appropriate. 
The present value criterion is justified and is used in this analysis, 
even though the benefits all accrue to the recreationist. 
The 10 percent rate of discount applied to the streams of benefits 
and costs is fairly high. But if the application of a higher rate favors 
the development of a project, the application of lower rates make it 
13 . 
Clawson and Knetsch, for example. 
14 d T . 192 See Prest an urvey, op. c1t., p. • 
even more favorable. Thus, the need for applying several rates, 
suggested as helpful to the decision maker, is eliminated. 
An outdoor recreation resort does not pose the problem of 
obsolescence, which makes the calculation of the length of life a 
critical issue. Hence, the choice of 29 years for discounting 
purposes implied is purely arbitrary. 
The capacity limitation which is a critical issue in the 
analysis of recreation, however, does not seem to arise in the 29 
years considered. The total annual attendance in the projection 
shown in Table 2 is 214,000 in the year 2000, whereas the projected 
annual capacity estimated by the Maryland State Parks is 267,108. 
Externalities 
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The categories of external benefits as reflected in a reduction 
in crime attributed to recreation is hardly the case with regard to 
Fort Frederick. Location is the main factor here. The distance 
of Fort Frederick makes it hardly accessible to the poor urban 
communities in Washington, which is alle~ed to experience a higher rate 
of crime. 
The other category of external benefits implicit in the fact that 
an area is conserved in natural beauty is left out in this calculation. 
The calculation reflects natural benefits to the extent that this aspect 
is appreciated by the people who visit the area. 
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External diseconomies are likely to appear in over-crowded outdoor 
recreation in terms of quality deterioration of the environment. But 
over-crowdedness and the intensity of use are more prevalent in private 
than public outdoor recreation, because the private operators "are under 




The methods used for Fort Frederick were largely illustrative in 
nature. With better samples of costs and expenditures on visits, the 
technique could be very useful for decision making with regard to the 
development of the 45 state parks in Maryland or other states for that 
matter. 
Although, in such larger applications, both the supply side and 
the demand side merit consideration, as is pointed out by Cicchetti 
16 17 
et al and Seneca. 
The important bearing that this study has on achieving efficiency 
in resource allocation in recreation is as follows: 
The income and population variables are highly significant in the 
demand equation (8). Both variables bear positive signs, and are demand 
15 Clawson and Knetsch, op. cit., p. 178. 
16 The Demand and Supply of Outdoor Recreation, op. cit. 
17"Water Recreation, Demand, and Supply," Water Resources Research 
(December, 1969). 
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shifters. The significance of that statement is that the higher the 
income and the population of an area the farther to the right the 
demand curve will be shifted. Whereas the shift due to larger 
population can be justified, the shift brought about by income is 
worth pondering. 
Assuming an average per capita income of $1,000 (which is not 
unreasonable for some of the areas of the states) the area under the 
demand curve for 1970 will amount to $122,423 compared with $953,399 
for an average income of $3~77. Thus, the size of income determines 
the location of the curve. 
If the method is applied for decision making purposes, an 
adjustment in the demand curves is called for to arrive at a balanced 
distribution of recreational facilities on the basis of merits from 
recreation and not the income of the population. 
Recreation is categorized as a public good not on the grounds of 
market failure entirely, but also on the grounds that profitability 
calculus is not amenable to the basic biological needs that man has 
for recreation. The urgency of this need should override the ability 





EXPENDITURES FOR RECREATION AND EXPENDITURES FOR WHEEL 
GOODS AND DURABLE SPORTS EQUIPMENT, 1909-62 
Recreation Expendi-
expendi- tures on 
tures as Personal sports 
Personal percentage Gross consumption eqpt., etc, 
consumption of national expendi- as 
expendi- Disposable disposable product, tures for percentages 
tures for personal personal per capita, sports of disposable 
recreation income income 1929 prices equpt., etc. income 
($ million) ($ billion) (per cent) ( $) ($ million) (Per cent) 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1909 860 26.6 3.2 608 
1914 1,000 29.6 3.4 632 
1919 2,180 63.3 3.4 710 
1921 2,055 60.2 3.4 660 
1923 2,620 69.7 3.8 766 
1925 2,835 73.0 3.9 781 
1927 3,120 77.4 4.0 817 
1929 4,331 83.1 5.2 857 219 0.26 
1930 3,990 74.4 5.4 772 172 0.23 
1931 3,302 63.8 5.2 721 159 0.25 
1932 2,442 48.7 5.0 611 llO 0.23 
1933 2,202 45.7 4.8 590 93 0.20 
1934 2,441 52.0 4.7 639 118 0.23 
1935 2,630 58.3 4.5 718 136 0.23 
1936 3,020 66.2 4.6 787 171 0.26 
1937 3,381 71.0 4.8 846 210 0.30 
1938 3,241 65.7 4.9 794 210 0.32 
1939 3,452 70.4 4.9 847 228 0.32 
1940 3, 761 76.1 4.9 916 254 0.33 




EXPENDITURES FOR RECREATION AND EXPENDIRUES FOR WHEEL 
GOODS AND DURABLE SPORTS EQUIPMENT, 1909-62 
Recreation Expendi-
expendi- tures on 
tures as Personal sports 
Personal percentage Gross consumption eqpt., etc. 
consumption of national expendi- as 
expendi- Disposable disposable product, tures for percentages 
tures for personal personal per capita, sports of disposable 
recreation income income 1929 prices eqpt., etc. income 
($ million) ($ billion) (per cent) ( $) ($ million) (per cent) 
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
1942 4,677 117.5 4.0 1,147 306 0.26 
1943 4,961 133.5 3.7 1,245 271 0.20 
1944 5,422 146.8 3.7 1,32 7 323 0.22 
1945 6,139 150.4 4.1 1,293 400 0.27 
1946 8,621 160.6 5.4 1,179 809 0.50 
194 7 9,352 170.1 5.5 1,149 972 0.57 
1948 9' 808 189.3 5.2 1,189 980 0.52 
1949 10,122 189.7 5.3 1,147 847 0.45 
1950 11,278 207.7 5.4 1,233 878 0.42 
1951 11,704 227.5 5.1 1,295 904 0.40 
1952 12,257 238.7 5.1 1,317 994 0.42 
1953 12,892 252.5 5.1 1,349 1,093 0.43 
1954 13,256 256.9 5.2 1,309 1,174 0.46 
1955 14,220 274.4 5.2 1,366 1,397 0.51 
1956 15,161 292.9 5.2 1,368 1,5 75 0.54 
1957 16,082 308.8 5.2 1,368 1,760 0.57 
1958 16,842 317.9 5.3 1,315 1,883 0.59 
1959 18,309 337.3 5.4 1,359 2,017 0.60 
1960 19,524 350.0 5.5 1,365 2,138 0.61 
1961 20,533 364.4 5.6 1,369 2,224 0.61 
1962 21,555 385.3 5.6 1,436 2,386 0.62 
\.0 
Source: Marion Clawson and Jack Knetsch, Economics of Outdoor Recreation (Baltimore: Johns -...! 
Hopkins Press, 1971), p. 318. 
Rates of Growth for Income and 
Expenditures on Recreation 
The rate of growth in come from column (4) (1,434/608) 1140= 1.02 
The rate of growth in expenditures on recreation from column (1) = 
(21,555/860) 1/ 40 = 1.07. 
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APPENDIX II 
The data gathered through a sample survey are contained in the 
following table. Column (l) is the number of observations, column (2) 
is the name of the counties from which the visitors came, column (3) 
is the distance travelled, column (4) is the number of people in a 
party of visitors, column (5) is the travel time to Fort Frederick, 
and column (6) is the total stay period for visitors. 
APPENDIX II - DATA FROM THE 
(1) ( 2) (3) (4) 
Distance Number of 
Obser- County Travelled People in 
vat ions Name (miles) 























































































































1 1/2 hrs. 
2 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/4 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
3 hrs. 
1 5/6 hrs. 
1 3/4 hrs. 
























































































Morgan, W. Va. 














































































1 1/2 hrs. 
2 hrs 
1 1/4 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/4 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
3 hrs. 
1 1/4 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
3 hrs. 
N.A. 
1 1/3 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/4 hrs. 
25 min. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
2 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 








































































Morris, N. J. 
II 

























































1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/4 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
2 1/2 hrs. 
1 1/2 hrs. 










5 1/4 hrs. 
2 hrs. 
2 hrs. 


























APPENDIX II - DATA FROM THE SAMPLE SURVEY (Continued) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Distance Number of 
Obser- County Travelled People in 
vations Name (Miles) the Partz Travel Time Stay Time 
4 District of Col. 75 1 1 1/4 hrs. 2 hrs. 
5 II 80 2 1 1/4 hrs. 4 hrs. 
6 II 80 2 1 1/4 hrs. 5 hrs. 
7 II 90 4 2 hrs. 8 hrs. 
8 II 90 2 3 hrs. 4 hrs. 
9 II 70 2 1 1/2 hrs. 1 hr. 
10 II 70 6+ 1 1/2 hrs. 24 hrs. 
11 II 105 6+ 3 hrs. 6 hrs. 
12 II 110 6+ 2 hrs. N .A. 
13 " 90 4 1 1/2 hrs. 1 hr. 
14 II 90 2 2 hrs. 1 1/2 hrs. 
15 " 90 4 3 hrs. 2 hrs. 
16 " 80 2 2 hrs. 0 
17 " 109 6+ 5 1/2 hrs. 2 hrs. 
18 " 80 1 2 hrs. 2 hrs. 
19 II 70 2 1 1/4 hrs. 2 hrs. 
20 II 75 3 1 1/2 hrs. 1 hr. 
21 II 75 4 2 hrs. 1 hr. 
22 " 80 2 1 1/2 hrs. 30 hrs. 
23 " 80 3 1 1/2 hrs. 12 hrs. 
24 " 70 2 2 hrs. 12 hrs. 
25 II 80 1 1 1/2 hrs. 24 hrs. 




Equation (8) in Chapter V was the best of approximately 30 
equations that were tried for estimating the demand for recreation 
at Fort Frederick. Seven of the equations are listed below as a 
sample of different models and forms tested. In all of the equations 
the nomenclature is the same as in equation (S). Thus, Vis visits, 
E is expenditures, P is population and ln is natural logs. 
In equation (1) below, where P is used as a divisor of the 
dependent variable, the new dependent variable, visits per capita 
(~), is negatively related toY. Although the coefficients are 
significant at about 90 percent, the negative relationship suggesting 
that as income increases one's recreational activity decreases, is open 
to question. 
(1) ~ = .0021 E - .000016 Y + .14 
p (.00054) ( .000007) 
R
2 
= • 74 
D-W = 1.45 
Equation (2) is equation (1) in logs form, with its R2 lower than 
for equation (1), and where ln Y no longer has a significant coefficient. 
(2) v ln -p - 1.11 ln E - .0289 ln Y - 6.45 
(.48) (.953) 
D-W = .98 
Equation (3) is the inverse of equation (1) where R2 is very 
low and none of the coefficients are significant. 
(3) v 13056200 ! + 4937 ! + 6761.62 





Equation (L1) is the same as equation (10) of Chapter V, without the 
explanatory variable (P). Hence, the R
2 
is lower than that for equation 
(10). Also note that ln Y is no longer significant; the coefficient 
does have a positive sign however. It should be pointed out that the 
omission of the variable population from equation (10), thus giving 
equation (4), the autocorrelation of residuals problem (equation (10) 
has D-W = 1.10) has increased as one would expect. 
(4) ln v 1.101 ln E + .0288 ln Y + 10.87 
(. 484) (1.95) 
R2 .42 
D-W • 987 
Equations (5), (6), and (7) are simple regressions of expendi-
2 
tures against visits. All have the same R , meaning that the simple 
transformation of the independent variable has only changed the 
2 
coefficient for the variable, and has left the R and the constant 
terms unaffected. 




(6) 1n v = - .738 ln E2 + 11.65 
(.278) 
R2 • 33 
D-W 1.472 
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(7) ln V = - 2.95 1n E112 + 11.65 
( 1. 09) 
R
2 
= • 33 
D-W == 1. 4 72 
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